l'ilui nishmat R' Avraham ben Yona Ya'akov
"Send for yourself men” (13; 2)
Rashi points out the reason that the story of the spies follows immediately after the story of Miriam (at the end of Beha'alotecha), since they both speak about lashon hara.
It is not clear to me why Rashi has to point this out. There are many sections of the Torah that we never ask about the reason for their juxtaposition, so why does Rashi need to say anything here?
Perhaps we can say that this juxtaposition requires particular explanation, based on the Talmud in Shabbat (116a) that it is not correct to put two bad topics next to each other. Here we have the tragedy of the spies immediately after the tragedy of Miriam, and this requires explanation. Therefore Rashi explains that they both deal with the same topic of lashon hara.
"Moshe called Hoshea bin Nun - Yehoshua” (13; 16)
We must point out that every time in the Torah and Nach that the word 'ben' appears it has three dots (segol) under the 'bet'. However, every time it says Yehoshua's name there is only one dot (chirik) so that it is read as 'bin'. This is strange. There must be some special reason for this unusual vocalisation.
There is only one other time that the word 'bin' is used, and that is in Mishlei (30; 1) “These are the words of Agur, son of (bin) Yakeh...” when the 'bet' also has a chirik. [There is also another time in Parshat Ki Tetzei, Devarim 15; 2, but there it doesn't mean 'son', so perhaps that is why the author doesn't mention it.] The Sages have discussed this in the midrash, and explained it aggadically (metaphorically) in Shemot Rabba Parshat Va'era section 6. However the explanation there has no relevance to the verse here. The Sages appear to say nothing at all about our case. Nor have any of the commentaries discussed it, and this is extremely strange.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Talmud (Sanhedrin 107a) and midrashim that say that the 'yud' that was taken from Sarai (after he name was changed to Sarah) complained about being removed from the Torah. It was only consoled when Moshe took it and added it to Hoshea's name to make Yehoshua (by adding a 'yud'). In this way the 'yud' that was removed from Sarai was replaced into the Torah.
This Talmud still leaves a difficulty, because even though Moshe found the 'yud' to add to Hoshea's name, where did he find the vowel to go under it? The 'yud' from Sarai had no vowel under it, whereas the 'yud' of Yehoshua has a 'sheva', which is two dots. We know that the number of dots in the Torah is precise and exact, so how could Moshe add two dots to the 'yud'? Therefore he had to remove the two dots from the 'bet' of 'ben' and replaced the 'segol' with a 'chirik'. This left two dots extra which were used for the 'yud'.
Even though this explanation is subtle and unusual, nevertheless, because of the uniqueness of the vocalisation of this word you should accept it.
[This doesn't explain why he was called Hoshea 'bin' Nun before Moshe added the 'yud' (verse 8) – perhaps the 'segol' was already removed in advance of the name change?]
"Moshe called Hoshea bin Nun - Yehoshua” (13; 16)
Rashi explains here, based on the midrash, that Moshe's intention in changing his name was to add a 'yud' to the 'heh' so that it would spell G-d's name, and as if to say 'G-d should save you from the advice of the spies' (because Moshe saw in a vision that it was posssible that the spies would sin, and he prayed that it shouldn't happen). We have to explain why Moshe prayed for Yehoshua more than for all the other spies, that he should be saved from speaking lashon hara and saying bad things about the land of Israel.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Midrash Rabba in parshat Vayeshev (end of section 86) regarding the nature of people. 'Throw a stick to the ground and it will return to where it came from'. This is an analogy to people who inherit their behaviour patterns from their parents. Like we find in the Midrash Rabba, Parshat Miketz, that when the goblet was found in the sack of Binyamin, and the brothers thought that he had stolen it, they all called him 'thief, the son of a thief'. They thought he was following in the footsteps of his mother who had stolen the idols from her father (Vayetze 31; 32). We also find this as a common saying amongst people, 'the lamb follows the ewe, the actions of the daughter are like the actions of the mother' (Ketubot 63a). Also in Yechezkel (16; 44) we find “the daughter is like the mother”.
We know that Yehoshua was from the tribe of Ephraim ben Yosef. Yosef had the attribute of speaking badly about others, like we find at the beginning of parshat Vayeshev (37; 2) “Yosef brought evil reports (about his brothers) to his father”. Therefore Moshe was concerned that this attribute might be part of Yehoshua's genetic makeup. Since he was so close to him as his student, Moshe prayed for him in particular, like for something which is likely to cause damage [which explains why he didn't also pray for Gadi ben Sussi from the tribe of Menashe, who was also descended from Yosef.]
We gave a similar explanation to something which we find many times in the Talmud. When Rav Yosef was amazed about something he would say 'Master of Avraham' (for example look in Shabbat 22a, and the other places listed there). We don't find anyone else who used this expression, nor is it explained why Rav Yosef chose this phrase to express his surprise or amazement, or why it was unique to him.
Perhaps we can explain based on what the Ran brings in Kiddushin (chapter one on the Talmud 31a) in the name of an aggada. That Rav Yosef was careful not to look outside of his immediate four amot. For this purpose he damaged his eyes [which eventually led to him becoming blind]. This trait of never looking outside the four amot was also a trait of Avraham. Like Rashi explains in parshat Lech Lecha on the verse “Now I know that you are beautiful” [that until that moment Avraham had not noticed how beautiful Sarah, his wife, was]. Also in the Midrash Rabba on Vayera (parshat 53) they said that he fulfilled the verse “close his eyes from seeing evil” (Yishiya 33; 15). Because of this trait of not looking at things away from himself, he didn't notice the actions of Yishmael. Therefore Rav Yosef had the same trait as Avraham, and therefore used this expression of surprise 'Master of Avraham'.
We also explained similarly the Talmud in Chagiga 14b, which tells of Rabbi Elazar ben Erech who expounded upon kabbalistic secrets of the nature of G-d. After he finished, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai stood up and kissed him on his head, and said, 'Blessed is G-d who gave such a son to Avraham our father'. He meant this same idea, because we know from midrashim that Avraham explored these kinds of ideas, and as explained by Rambam at the beginning of his laws of idolatry. Therefore he connected Elazar ben Erech to Avraham because he followed in his footsteps.
Showing posts with label tosefet bracha. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tosefet bracha. Show all posts
Saturday, June 14, 2008
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Tosefet Bracha Lech Lecha
I will bless those who bless you, and those who curse you I will curse. (12: 2)
From a simple reading of the words it seems that those who bless Avram will be blessed by G-d earlier, before they bless him, but those who curse him will only be cursed after they have done so. This is the meaning of the words “I will bless (previously) those who bless you, and those who curse you I will curse (afterwards). To be parallel the verse should have said “I will curse those who curse you”. This requires explanation:
The intention of the verse may be that the blessing of a rich man is more valuable than the blessing of a pauper. Conversely the curse of a poor man is worse than the curse of a wealthy person.
Because a rich person is stuffed full of everything good, when he blesses he blesses with plenty of goodness, since just having average wealth is considered ‘normal’ for him, therefore it would not be considered by him to be a blessing. So when he blesses with goodness his blessing is expansive and beyond the average wealth. For a pauper it is the opposite, since his soul is empty from the goodness of life, and he lives on a crust of bread, his concept of blessing is stunted and limited, and he would consider even a meagre existence to be a blessing.
Therefore G-d wanted that those who bless Avraham should be able to conceive of a generous blessing. That is why G-d gave them blessing beforehand, so that when they come to bless Avraham they will bless with plenty. So the verse says “I will bless those who bless you”.
With a curse it is the opposite. Someone who is stuffed full of goodness, when he curses he thinks of someone who has meat and wine, but not of such good quality. However a poor person, since he knows starvation, curses with famine and thirst.
When G-d wants that someone who curses Avraham will themselves be cursed, He wants them first to curse while they still have wealth and only afterwards to be cursed themselves. So the verse says “Those who curse you I will curse”, they will only be cursed after they have cursed Avraham, in order to limit the severity of their curse.
This explains the order of the words in the verse.
From a simple reading of the words it seems that those who bless Avram will be blessed by G-d earlier, before they bless him, but those who curse him will only be cursed after they have done so. This is the meaning of the words “I will bless (previously) those who bless you, and those who curse you I will curse (afterwards). To be parallel the verse should have said “I will curse those who curse you”. This requires explanation:
The intention of the verse may be that the blessing of a rich man is more valuable than the blessing of a pauper. Conversely the curse of a poor man is worse than the curse of a wealthy person.
Because a rich person is stuffed full of everything good, when he blesses he blesses with plenty of goodness, since just having average wealth is considered ‘normal’ for him, therefore it would not be considered by him to be a blessing. So when he blesses with goodness his blessing is expansive and beyond the average wealth. For a pauper it is the opposite, since his soul is empty from the goodness of life, and he lives on a crust of bread, his concept of blessing is stunted and limited, and he would consider even a meagre existence to be a blessing.
Therefore G-d wanted that those who bless Avraham should be able to conceive of a generous blessing. That is why G-d gave them blessing beforehand, so that when they come to bless Avraham they will bless with plenty. So the verse says “I will bless those who bless you”.
With a curse it is the opposite. Someone who is stuffed full of goodness, when he curses he thinks of someone who has meat and wine, but not of such good quality. However a poor person, since he knows starvation, curses with famine and thirst.
When G-d wants that someone who curses Avraham will themselves be cursed, He wants them first to curse while they still have wealth and only afterwards to be cursed themselves. So the verse says “Those who curse you I will curse”, they will only be cursed after they have cursed Avraham, in order to limit the severity of their curse.
This explains the order of the words in the verse.
Friday, October 05, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Bereishit 2
In the beginning (1: 1)
There are many hints in this first verse. Look at Rashi, who brings some of the allusions. We can also find a hint to what we explained in the previous piece. We have a tradition in the Talmud that the world will exist for 6000 years, and then be destroyed for 1000 years. We explained above that this is a 7000 year cycle which repeats over and over again.
We can find a hint to this in the first verse. The Hebrew word for 1000 is eleph, and the word for destroyed is shamam. In the first verse there are seven words – Bereishit Bara Elokim Et Ha-shamayim v-Et Ha-Aretz. Each of the words contains the letter aleph (related to the word for 1000) except for the word Ha-Shamayim The root of the word Shamayim is the word shamam (as we find in Iyov 32: 43 “Utterly destroyed without any life”). The six words with the letter aleph allude to the six thousand (eleph) years, and the seventh word (Shamayim) alludes to the destruction (Shamam), which is the only world without the letter aleph.
There are many hints in this first verse. Look at Rashi, who brings some of the allusions. We can also find a hint to what we explained in the previous piece. We have a tradition in the Talmud that the world will exist for 6000 years, and then be destroyed for 1000 years. We explained above that this is a 7000 year cycle which repeats over and over again.
We can find a hint to this in the first verse. The Hebrew word for 1000 is eleph, and the word for destroyed is shamam. In the first verse there are seven words – Bereishit Bara Elokim Et Ha-shamayim v-Et Ha-Aretz. Each of the words contains the letter aleph (related to the word for 1000) except for the word Ha-Shamayim The root of the word Shamayim is the word shamam (as we find in Iyov 32: 43 “Utterly destroyed without any life”). The six words with the letter aleph allude to the six thousand (eleph) years, and the seventh word (Shamayim) alludes to the destruction (Shamam), which is the only world without the letter aleph.
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Bereishit
“In the beginning” (1: 1)
(an exploration of the idea of when the world was created)
It states in masechet Sanhedrin (97a): The world will be for 6000 years and 1000 it will be destroyed.
Rashi explains that apart from the 6000 years there will be another 1000 years of destruction and desolation.
The Talmud there explains that the 1000 years of desolation corresponds to the shmita year (as explained in parshat Behar), and thus the world has a shmita of 1000 years every 7000 years.
The relationship between the years of the world and the shmita year can be explained because the reason for shmita every seven years corresponds to G-d resting on the seventh day of creation (which was Shabbat). Therefore the shmita of the 7000th year primarily relates to resting from Creation. It is known that a day of G-d is 1000 years, as the verse states “For a thousand years in Your eyes is like from yesterday to today” (Tehillim 90: 4). Therefore the worlds has a shmita every 7000th year.
However the entire concept of the shmita of the 7000th year, based on the wording “and one thousand destroyed” means that it is part of a long chain without end, from the time of the first creation. Since then this cycle has repeated itself every 6000 years, with 1000 years of destruction following. It as then rebuilt every time for another 6000 years. This repeated over and over again.
It is almost certain that this is the meaning of the midrash rabba on this parsha on the verse “And it was evening and it was morning” which says that G-d creates worlds and destroys them, creates worlds and destroys them.
This also fits with the words of the Talmud that we brought above, that the world will last for 6000 years then be destroyed for 1000. This means that after every 6000 years there is 1000 of destruction before the world is renewed. Only G-d knows which cycle of 7000 years we are in at the moment.
This is clear from the words ‘destroyed for 1000’ which implies a cycle as we have said. If there would only be 6000 years to the world altogether followed by destruction it would not make sense to talk of 1000 years of destruction since after the 6000 the destruction would be forever. But according to what we have said it makes sense, because after the destruction there will be a new beginning.
There is another reason why it is difficult to understand that after 6000 years there will be total destruction forever, because we are now towards the end of the 5000th year, with only a couple of hundred years until that destruction. Even if the redemption were to occur today, does it make sense that the reward for all the thousands of years of exile would be sandwiched into such a small time of only a couple of hundred years? About this the Talmud says ‘Do you think G-d brings judgement without justice?’ (Brachot 5b).
Furthermore, just before the redemption all settlement of the world will cease. As the Talmud says (Avodah Zarah 9b) ‘if a person were to offer to sell you a field worth 1000 dinars for only a single dinar don’t accept the offer’.
Also, based on the analogy between the seven year shmita cycle and the years of creation it must be that the destruction of the 7000th year cannot be a permanent destruction. The shmita year only lasts for one year, and after that year everything returns to the way it was, so it must be also that the years of creation with the ‘shmita’ of the 7000th year is only temporary, and afterwards everything will return to its normal way.
Perhaps the reason for the destruction of the world from time to time is congruous with the way things work in the world. When someone builds new houses in a place where old houses stood earlier, the entire foundations of the original buildings must be completely destroyed and the area cleared and only then can the foundations be laid for the new buildings. So too with the world, after a period of 6000 years all the building and foundation of the past era must be destroyed so that new building can begin for another 6000 years afterwards.
This is the way that G-d fixed the nature of the world. When someone plants seeds in the earth, they must first be destroyed and only afterwards can they begin to sprout. Similarly, a new world can begin to sprout after the destruction and decay of the world and everything that is within it.
Based on this we can explain the Aggada in Talmud Shabbat (152b): If someone has jealousy his bones will rot (after his death), and anyone who doesn’t have jealousy, his bones will not rot. This is based on the words of a verse. Then the Talmud challenges: Doesn’t the verse states, “You shall return to dust” (and Rashi explains that the decree against Adam the first man also applies to every person since). The Talmud explains that this only applies just before the resurrection of the dead. In other words, the rot that was decreed for someone who doesn’t have jealousy will only be a moment before the resurrection. It doesn’t explain the purpose of the rotting, or define the time which is ‘just before the resurrection of the dead’.
But the explanation is as follows, based on what we said above: In order to have a new life in the resurrection of the dead, it is necessary that the former body be destroyed and rots into dust. If someone is jealous this rotting takes place as part of the natural process. However, someone who does not have jealousy, his bones remain whole and ready until a moment before the resurrection. At that time it is necessary for them to rot so that they can come back to the new life that will come, to fulfil the decree of “You shall return to dust”.
We will see the purpose of the destruction of the world in the Aggada that we will bring shortly. For those thousand years while G-d is renewing the world, He will make wings for the righteous and they will fly over the surface of the water. However we understand the Aggada, it certainly seems that the world will be completely covered with water.
With what we have explained we can also understand the verses in parshat Va’etchanan (Devarim 7) where it says about G-d that he keeps the covenant and the kindness for a thousand generations. Also in Tehillim (105: 8) it states “He commanded His word for a thousand generations”. As we know, a generation is seventy years, as the verse states “the days of his life in them are seventy years” (ibid. 90: 10). See also at Talmud Yevamot (50a). A thousand generations is therefore 70,000 years. G-d is guaranteeing the world’s existence for that length of time. So the number of 6000 years for the world must be only for one period of the world’s existence, which will repeat until that total number of years.
With this we can understand how scientists have found trees and bones of animals that clearly lived tens of thousands of years ago (look at ‘Oh Hachaim’ by the author of Tiferet Yisrael at the end of Nezikin). This is no contradiction to our counting of years, since they are just remnants of earlier periods of the world’s existence which somehow survived the destruction and lasted until now. Just as the Talmud (Nida 61a) says that Og King of Bashan remained (and survived) from the flood, or that three boiling pools of water survived from the time of the flood (Sanhedrin 108a).
(an exploration of the idea of when the world was created)
It states in masechet Sanhedrin (97a): The world will be for 6000 years and 1000 it will be destroyed.
Rashi explains that apart from the 6000 years there will be another 1000 years of destruction and desolation.
The Talmud there explains that the 1000 years of desolation corresponds to the shmita year (as explained in parshat Behar), and thus the world has a shmita of 1000 years every 7000 years.
The relationship between the years of the world and the shmita year can be explained because the reason for shmita every seven years corresponds to G-d resting on the seventh day of creation (which was Shabbat). Therefore the shmita of the 7000th year primarily relates to resting from Creation. It is known that a day of G-d is 1000 years, as the verse states “For a thousand years in Your eyes is like from yesterday to today” (Tehillim 90: 4). Therefore the worlds has a shmita every 7000th year.
However the entire concept of the shmita of the 7000th year, based on the wording “and one thousand destroyed” means that it is part of a long chain without end, from the time of the first creation. Since then this cycle has repeated itself every 6000 years, with 1000 years of destruction following. It as then rebuilt every time for another 6000 years. This repeated over and over again.
It is almost certain that this is the meaning of the midrash rabba on this parsha on the verse “And it was evening and it was morning” which says that G-d creates worlds and destroys them, creates worlds and destroys them.
This also fits with the words of the Talmud that we brought above, that the world will last for 6000 years then be destroyed for 1000. This means that after every 6000 years there is 1000 of destruction before the world is renewed. Only G-d knows which cycle of 7000 years we are in at the moment.
This is clear from the words ‘destroyed for 1000’ which implies a cycle as we have said. If there would only be 6000 years to the world altogether followed by destruction it would not make sense to talk of 1000 years of destruction since after the 6000 the destruction would be forever. But according to what we have said it makes sense, because after the destruction there will be a new beginning.
There is another reason why it is difficult to understand that after 6000 years there will be total destruction forever, because we are now towards the end of the 5000th year, with only a couple of hundred years until that destruction. Even if the redemption were to occur today, does it make sense that the reward for all the thousands of years of exile would be sandwiched into such a small time of only a couple of hundred years? About this the Talmud says ‘Do you think G-d brings judgement without justice?’ (Brachot 5b).
Furthermore, just before the redemption all settlement of the world will cease. As the Talmud says (Avodah Zarah 9b) ‘if a person were to offer to sell you a field worth 1000 dinars for only a single dinar don’t accept the offer’.
Also, based on the analogy between the seven year shmita cycle and the years of creation it must be that the destruction of the 7000th year cannot be a permanent destruction. The shmita year only lasts for one year, and after that year everything returns to the way it was, so it must be also that the years of creation with the ‘shmita’ of the 7000th year is only temporary, and afterwards everything will return to its normal way.
Perhaps the reason for the destruction of the world from time to time is congruous with the way things work in the world. When someone builds new houses in a place where old houses stood earlier, the entire foundations of the original buildings must be completely destroyed and the area cleared and only then can the foundations be laid for the new buildings. So too with the world, after a period of 6000 years all the building and foundation of the past era must be destroyed so that new building can begin for another 6000 years afterwards.
This is the way that G-d fixed the nature of the world. When someone plants seeds in the earth, they must first be destroyed and only afterwards can they begin to sprout. Similarly, a new world can begin to sprout after the destruction and decay of the world and everything that is within it.
Based on this we can explain the Aggada in Talmud Shabbat (152b): If someone has jealousy his bones will rot (after his death), and anyone who doesn’t have jealousy, his bones will not rot. This is based on the words of a verse. Then the Talmud challenges: Doesn’t the verse states, “You shall return to dust” (and Rashi explains that the decree against Adam the first man also applies to every person since). The Talmud explains that this only applies just before the resurrection of the dead. In other words, the rot that was decreed for someone who doesn’t have jealousy will only be a moment before the resurrection. It doesn’t explain the purpose of the rotting, or define the time which is ‘just before the resurrection of the dead’.
But the explanation is as follows, based on what we said above: In order to have a new life in the resurrection of the dead, it is necessary that the former body be destroyed and rots into dust. If someone is jealous this rotting takes place as part of the natural process. However, someone who does not have jealousy, his bones remain whole and ready until a moment before the resurrection. At that time it is necessary for them to rot so that they can come back to the new life that will come, to fulfil the decree of “You shall return to dust”.
We will see the purpose of the destruction of the world in the Aggada that we will bring shortly. For those thousand years while G-d is renewing the world, He will make wings for the righteous and they will fly over the surface of the water. However we understand the Aggada, it certainly seems that the world will be completely covered with water.
With what we have explained we can also understand the verses in parshat Va’etchanan (Devarim 7) where it says about G-d that he keeps the covenant and the kindness for a thousand generations. Also in Tehillim (105: 8) it states “He commanded His word for a thousand generations”. As we know, a generation is seventy years, as the verse states “the days of his life in them are seventy years” (ibid. 90: 10). See also at Talmud Yevamot (50a). A thousand generations is therefore 70,000 years. G-d is guaranteeing the world’s existence for that length of time. So the number of 6000 years for the world must be only for one period of the world’s existence, which will repeat until that total number of years.
With this we can understand how scientists have found trees and bones of animals that clearly lived tens of thousands of years ago (look at ‘Oh Hachaim’ by the author of Tiferet Yisrael at the end of Nezikin). This is no contradiction to our counting of years, since they are just remnants of earlier periods of the world’s existence which somehow survived the destruction and lasted until now. Just as the Talmud (Nida 61a) says that Og King of Bashan remained (and survived) from the flood, or that three boiling pools of water survived from the time of the flood (Sanhedrin 108a).
Monday, September 03, 2007
Tosefet Bracha Netzavim
“You are standing here today” (29: 9)
Rashi brings a midrash: Why is this section of “You are standing” immediately following the portion of Ki Tavo? Because when the Israel heard 98 curses their faces turned green, and they said to themselves, ‘who can possibly live up to this?’ Moshe began to calm them down and said, ‘you are standing here today. You have angered G-d many times in the past, yet you still stand before Him’.
It seems to me that this is the basis for the Mishna in Pirkei Avos (1: 7) ‘Don’t despair from the punishment’. In Yalkut Yirmiya (34) this is explained in two different ways. When a person is surrounded by good things, he should not ‘despair’ of the bad things, and think that they can never happen to him. And when things are going badly for him, he should not despair that good things will happen to him in the future. Look also what we wrote about this later (verse 12).
We should point out that the Gemara (Brachot 10a) says in the name of King Chizkiyahu: ‘This is the tradition I have from my father’s house. Even if a sharp sword is placed to your neck, never despair of G-d’s mercy’.
It seems likely that the basis of this tradition are the words of the Torah here, as Rashi explained them.
It is also possible to explain a related concept in the laws of stolen or lost items. If the owner despairs of ever finding the stolen or lost item again, he loses his rights to it (if it is found by someone else in a different place – Bava Kama 115a). It is not explained why the original owner should be punished and lose his possession.
Perhaps this is some kind of ‘penalty’ for the fact that he despaired of ever finding them again, since it is forbidden to despair, even if a sharp sword is held to your neck. This person who despaired of finding it again showed a lack of trust in G-d, and therefore was penalised.
Rashi brings a midrash: Why is this section of “You are standing” immediately following the portion of Ki Tavo? Because when the Israel heard 98 curses their faces turned green, and they said to themselves, ‘who can possibly live up to this?’ Moshe began to calm them down and said, ‘you are standing here today. You have angered G-d many times in the past, yet you still stand before Him’.
It seems to me that this is the basis for the Mishna in Pirkei Avos (1: 7) ‘Don’t despair from the punishment’. In Yalkut Yirmiya (34) this is explained in two different ways. When a person is surrounded by good things, he should not ‘despair’ of the bad things, and think that they can never happen to him. And when things are going badly for him, he should not despair that good things will happen to him in the future. Look also what we wrote about this later (verse 12).
We should point out that the Gemara (Brachot 10a) says in the name of King Chizkiyahu: ‘This is the tradition I have from my father’s house. Even if a sharp sword is placed to your neck, never despair of G-d’s mercy’.
It seems likely that the basis of this tradition are the words of the Torah here, as Rashi explained them.
It is also possible to explain a related concept in the laws of stolen or lost items. If the owner despairs of ever finding the stolen or lost item again, he loses his rights to it (if it is found by someone else in a different place – Bava Kama 115a). It is not explained why the original owner should be punished and lose his possession.
Perhaps this is some kind of ‘penalty’ for the fact that he despaired of ever finding them again, since it is forbidden to despair, even if a sharp sword is held to your neck. This person who despaired of finding it again showed a lack of trust in G-d, and therefore was penalised.
Monday, August 13, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Shoftim
“So that he not elevate his heart from his brothers nor to depart from the mitzvot right or left” (17:20)
The connection between these two attributes – prevention of pride and observance of mitzvot – can be explained based on the well known story in Shmuel 1. When Shaul sinned by not completely destroying Amalek and all his possessions, he tried to excuse himself before Shmuel “For the people took pity on the best of the flocks”. Shmuel said to him, “If you are small in your own eyes, nevertheless you are the head of the tribes of Israel” (Shmuel 1 15:16). The meaning of these words of chastisement is to say that even though a simple, private individual may take into account that “the people took pity”, and that would be sufficient excuse, because he would not be able to go against the will of the people. But before the head of the nation, that is the king, this is not an excuse, because he should have stood up to the people with strength to fulfil the mitzvah of G-d.
This is the meaning of this mitzvah here, that his heart should not become elevated. Even though he also doesn’t have permission to elevate himself above the people – ‘to trample on the heads of the holy nation’, yet despite that he must know how to use his authority when it is required for the honour of G-d, to not “depart from the mitzvah”.
Based on this explanation I also understood the meaning of the words regarding Yehoshafat king of Yehuda. “He raised his heart in the ways of G-d and removed the altars from the high places and the asheiras” (Divrei Hayamim 2 17:6). The connection between the raised heart in the ways of G-d and removing the altars is that Yehoshafat was modest and humble, as the verse in Melachim (22:43) testifies about him, and the Sages (Ketubot 103b) explained based on the verse in Tehillim (15:4) “Those who feared G-d were heavy upon Yehoshafat”. The Sages said that when he would see a Torah scholar he would stand up from his throne and hug and kiss him, and call him ‘my master, my master, my teacher, my teacher’. And he instructed the judges that he established in the cities of Yehuda and Yerushalayim in the fear of G-d with faithfulness and a full heart (Divrei Hayamim 2 19:6-9). He was very far from any kind of feeling of pride. Nevertheless, when it came to a matter of G-d’s honour, then he conducted himself with haughtiness and did what had to be done for this purpose, to remove the altars form the high places and the asheiras. He didn’t use his modesty as an excuse.
It is also possible with this explanation to understand the continuation of the verses in Tehillim (51:19) “the offerings to G-d are a humble spirit, a broken and lowly heart won’t reject G-d”. The meaning is that even though a person offers sacrifices to G-d though feeling humility and lowliness before G-d, and not becoming proud, since “G-d hates anyone who is proud” (Mishlei 16:8), and “Haughty eyes and proud heart, he will not eat” (Tehillim 101:5), and there are many other bad character traits connected to this trait of pride.
Nevertheless, this verse says that even though “an offering to G-d is a humble spirit, a broken and lowly heart”, yet they “won’t reject G-d”. In other words, despite all this, they may not use this character trait to become so attached to the trait of humility that it comes to degrading the word of G-d, to desecrate the holy things, or to desecrate the Torah and mitzvot.
This verse comes to teach and to limit the trait of modesty. With every trait there is a time to use it and a time to abandon it. As the Sages said (Shabbat 119b) ‘Yerushalayim was only destroyed because they didn’t reprove one another’. The explanation is that the Sages were so strong in their trait of modesty, to an extreme degree, that they felt that they were not worthy of reproaching others. This path of theirs led to the destruction of Yerushalayim and the exile of the Jewish people.
We find a similar concept in Gitin (55b): ‘The humility of Rabbi Zechariah destroyed our city’, and everything that is explained there, with the results of those events.
In the Talmud Sotah (5a) the Sages said: ‘A Torah scholar must have a tiny fraction (and eighth of an eighth) of pride’. Rashi explains the reason is that they should not allow the fools to mock them. And they should ensure that their words are heard by others. This explains the Talmud in Brachot (34b) that the king bows (at the beginning of the Amida and doesn’t straighten up until the end). Rashi explains that the greater a person is, the more they must humble and lower themselves. There it is referring to humility before G-d while praying. But this is not relevant to our discussion here. Look what we wrote about this on the last verse of the Torah.
The connection between these two attributes – prevention of pride and observance of mitzvot – can be explained based on the well known story in Shmuel 1. When Shaul sinned by not completely destroying Amalek and all his possessions, he tried to excuse himself before Shmuel “For the people took pity on the best of the flocks”. Shmuel said to him, “If you are small in your own eyes, nevertheless you are the head of the tribes of Israel” (Shmuel 1 15:16). The meaning of these words of chastisement is to say that even though a simple, private individual may take into account that “the people took pity”, and that would be sufficient excuse, because he would not be able to go against the will of the people. But before the head of the nation, that is the king, this is not an excuse, because he should have stood up to the people with strength to fulfil the mitzvah of G-d.
This is the meaning of this mitzvah here, that his heart should not become elevated. Even though he also doesn’t have permission to elevate himself above the people – ‘to trample on the heads of the holy nation’, yet despite that he must know how to use his authority when it is required for the honour of G-d, to not “depart from the mitzvah”.
Based on this explanation I also understood the meaning of the words regarding Yehoshafat king of Yehuda. “He raised his heart in the ways of G-d and removed the altars from the high places and the asheiras” (Divrei Hayamim 2 17:6). The connection between the raised heart in the ways of G-d and removing the altars is that Yehoshafat was modest and humble, as the verse in Melachim (22:43) testifies about him, and the Sages (Ketubot 103b) explained based on the verse in Tehillim (15:4) “Those who feared G-d were heavy upon Yehoshafat”. The Sages said that when he would see a Torah scholar he would stand up from his throne and hug and kiss him, and call him ‘my master, my master, my teacher, my teacher’. And he instructed the judges that he established in the cities of Yehuda and Yerushalayim in the fear of G-d with faithfulness and a full heart (Divrei Hayamim 2 19:6-9). He was very far from any kind of feeling of pride. Nevertheless, when it came to a matter of G-d’s honour, then he conducted himself with haughtiness and did what had to be done for this purpose, to remove the altars form the high places and the asheiras. He didn’t use his modesty as an excuse.
It is also possible with this explanation to understand the continuation of the verses in Tehillim (51:19) “the offerings to G-d are a humble spirit, a broken and lowly heart won’t reject G-d”. The meaning is that even though a person offers sacrifices to G-d though feeling humility and lowliness before G-d, and not becoming proud, since “G-d hates anyone who is proud” (Mishlei 16:8), and “Haughty eyes and proud heart, he will not eat” (Tehillim 101:5), and there are many other bad character traits connected to this trait of pride.
Nevertheless, this verse says that even though “an offering to G-d is a humble spirit, a broken and lowly heart”, yet they “won’t reject G-d”. In other words, despite all this, they may not use this character trait to become so attached to the trait of humility that it comes to degrading the word of G-d, to desecrate the holy things, or to desecrate the Torah and mitzvot.
This verse comes to teach and to limit the trait of modesty. With every trait there is a time to use it and a time to abandon it. As the Sages said (Shabbat 119b) ‘Yerushalayim was only destroyed because they didn’t reprove one another’. The explanation is that the Sages were so strong in their trait of modesty, to an extreme degree, that they felt that they were not worthy of reproaching others. This path of theirs led to the destruction of Yerushalayim and the exile of the Jewish people.
We find a similar concept in Gitin (55b): ‘The humility of Rabbi Zechariah destroyed our city’, and everything that is explained there, with the results of those events.
In the Talmud Sotah (5a) the Sages said: ‘A Torah scholar must have a tiny fraction (and eighth of an eighth) of pride’. Rashi explains the reason is that they should not allow the fools to mock them. And they should ensure that their words are heard by others. This explains the Talmud in Brachot (34b) that the king bows (at the beginning of the Amida and doesn’t straighten up until the end). Rashi explains that the greater a person is, the more they must humble and lower themselves. There it is referring to humility before G-d while praying. But this is not relevant to our discussion here. Look what we wrote about this on the last verse of the Torah.
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Reeh
“The blessing, that you will listen to the commandments of G-d” (11:27)
In the following verse regarding the curses it states “and you veer from the path that I command you this day, to go after other gods”. The contrast is clear and obvious. With the blessing the verse says “listen”, which implies merely hearing and accepting to keep the commandments even without any actual action to do so. Whereas in the curses the verse makes them contingent on “veering from the path”, only if a person actually goes and does something, but as long as they are only thinking about it, even though in their mind they have already veered, they won’t receive the curses.
In the Torah Temima we wrote that this can be explained based on the Talmud (Kidushin 40b), that G-d combines good thoughts to the actions (and gives reward already from the moment of thought), but with bad deeds He only considers it from when the deed is actually done. Therefore regarding the blessing it states “you will listen”, as soon as you have listened you already receive the reward as if you have already done the action, whereas with the curses it is only once you have actually veered from the path, to do actions, and the thought is not counted.
That was how we explained in the Torah Temima. However now I regret having written that, because the Talmud there explains that with the sin of idolatry even thought is included with the action. Here in the verse it states “and you veer from the path that I command you this day, to go after other gods”, which is idolatry. Therefore we have to explain based on the Talmud in Shabbat 105b which says that a person doesn’t commit the sin of idolatry with the first tempting of the yetzer hara. Rather it works gradually, from the small sin to the bigger sin. The first sins are not sins of idolatry, and therefore the thought and intent for them is not included in the punishment.
This is implicit in the verse: “you will veer from the path that I command you this day” – from ordinary mitzvot, and this will lead to “to go after other gods”. This is the meaning of the Talmud, initially the yetzer hara says to a person ‘do this small sin’. The next day it says ‘do this slightly worse sin’ until finally it leads a person so idolatry.
In the following verse regarding the curses it states “and you veer from the path that I command you this day, to go after other gods”. The contrast is clear and obvious. With the blessing the verse says “listen”, which implies merely hearing and accepting to keep the commandments even without any actual action to do so. Whereas in the curses the verse makes them contingent on “veering from the path”, only if a person actually goes and does something, but as long as they are only thinking about it, even though in their mind they have already veered, they won’t receive the curses.
In the Torah Temima we wrote that this can be explained based on the Talmud (Kidushin 40b), that G-d combines good thoughts to the actions (and gives reward already from the moment of thought), but with bad deeds He only considers it from when the deed is actually done. Therefore regarding the blessing it states “you will listen”, as soon as you have listened you already receive the reward as if you have already done the action, whereas with the curses it is only once you have actually veered from the path, to do actions, and the thought is not counted.
That was how we explained in the Torah Temima. However now I regret having written that, because the Talmud there explains that with the sin of idolatry even thought is included with the action. Here in the verse it states “and you veer from the path that I command you this day, to go after other gods”, which is idolatry. Therefore we have to explain based on the Talmud in Shabbat 105b which says that a person doesn’t commit the sin of idolatry with the first tempting of the yetzer hara. Rather it works gradually, from the small sin to the bigger sin. The first sins are not sins of idolatry, and therefore the thought and intent for them is not included in the punishment.
This is implicit in the verse: “you will veer from the path that I command you this day” – from ordinary mitzvot, and this will lead to “to go after other gods”. This is the meaning of the Talmud, initially the yetzer hara says to a person ‘do this small sin’. The next day it says ‘do this slightly worse sin’ until finally it leads a person so idolatry.
Friday, July 20, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Devarim
BEGINNINGS ARE IMPORTANT
“In the wilderness, in the plain” (1: 1)
Rashi explains (in the beginning of this verse) that these are the places that Israel angered G-d. Out of respect for Israel he didn’t list the sins themselves, but hinted to them by mentioning the place names where they occurred.
This seems difficult. In the continuation of the book of Devarim Moshe lists all the sins explicitly with all the details. for example in parshat Ekev (9: 7) “Remember how you angered G-d and made for yourselves a golden calf” It also says there “You would anger G-d”. In our parsha it states “Remember the incident of the spies”. Moshe wasn’t concerned in those cases about their honour.
Perhaps we can explain Rasbi’s intent based on what he wrote in parshat Beha’alotecha (Bamidbar 9: 1) regarding Pesach Sheni. “The book of Bamidbar should have begun with this incident (because it happened in the first month, whereas the beginning of Bamidbar is the second month). However, because it alludes to the disgrace of the Jews (since in the entire forty years in the wilderness this was the only time they did the Pesach sacrifice – see Tosefot Kiddushin 37b s.v. ho’il for an explanation of this), the Torah did not want to begin the book with it, out of respect for the book.
It is clear from here that the main objection is only at the beginning of a book, out of respect for the book, but in the continuation of the book there is no issue. Thus we can explain that the Torah only needed to allude to the sins at the beginning of the book, because it did not wish to begin with the disgrace of Israel, and therefore had to only hint to them. However, later in the book, there is no problem with stating the sins explicitly.
With this chidush we can also understand the Talmud in the beginning of Pesachim (3a). There it explains that a person should always speak using clean and respectable language, and they learn this from the language in the Torah in parshat Noach. It says there (Berieshis 7: 5) “From the animals that are pure and form the animals that are not pure even though the Torah could have used fewer words and simply written ‘the impure animals’. This is because ‘impure’ is not dignified language. Rashi explains that even though the Torah uses the word ‘impure’ several times, here the Torah changed its language to teach us that we should always try and use clean language.
Rashi’s explanation requires elaboration. Based on what we have said above, that being particular about clean and decent language is only the at the beginning of a book. This verse in Noach is the first time that the concepts of pure and impure appear, therefore the Torah wrote it using clean language, as the first time.
Also there in Pesachim it says; It was taught in the house of Rabbi Yishmael that a person should always speak with clean language. It explains there that for this reason the Mishna uses the word ‘ohr’ (light) to mean evening (in the evening of the fourteenth) rather than the word ‘lail’, because ‘light’ is a nicer way of saying it than ‘night’, which is language of darkness an depression, like we find in creation ‘He called the darkness ‘night’.” And also in Tehillim (104: 20) “Darkness comes and it is night”.
However later in the gemara (7b) it uses that word explicitly – ‘It was taught in the house of Rabbi Yishmael that on the night of the fourteenth we check for chametz…’. It seems as though the house of Rabbi Yishmael are contradicting themselves, first they say that we must use nice language – ‘light’ instead of ‘night’, and then they themselves use the word ‘night’ of the fourteenth. How can we reconcile these two?
The explanation is that when one learns in depth in the middle of a book, there is no obligation to use the nicest language (provided, of course, that it is not crass or foul language), since the mind is involved in learning deeply, and is not able to think of nice words. However at the beginning of a book, at the beginning of the first Mishna, it is required. Out of honour for the beginning of the book it is appropriate to search for the best language – ‘light’ of the fourteenth. But when the house of Rabbi Yishmael were involved in the intricacies of the halacha, they were not particular on their language and used ‘night’ of the fourteenth.
If goes without saying that if it is possible to do both – to learn in depth and use good language, certainly that is the best. That is the basis of the proof there from the language of ‘riding’ and ‘sitting’ regarding a zav and zava. The Mishna uses ‘sitting’ instead of ‘riding’ when speaking about a zava because it is better language to say ‘sitting’ regarding a female.
“In the wilderness, in the plain” (1: 1)
Rashi explains (in the beginning of this verse) that these are the places that Israel angered G-d. Out of respect for Israel he didn’t list the sins themselves, but hinted to them by mentioning the place names where they occurred.
This seems difficult. In the continuation of the book of Devarim Moshe lists all the sins explicitly with all the details. for example in parshat Ekev (9: 7) “Remember how you angered G-d and made for yourselves a golden calf” It also says there “You would anger G-d”. In our parsha it states “Remember the incident of the spies”. Moshe wasn’t concerned in those cases about their honour.
Perhaps we can explain Rasbi’s intent based on what he wrote in parshat Beha’alotecha (Bamidbar 9: 1) regarding Pesach Sheni. “The book of Bamidbar should have begun with this incident (because it happened in the first month, whereas the beginning of Bamidbar is the second month). However, because it alludes to the disgrace of the Jews (since in the entire forty years in the wilderness this was the only time they did the Pesach sacrifice – see Tosefot Kiddushin 37b s.v. ho’il for an explanation of this), the Torah did not want to begin the book with it, out of respect for the book.
It is clear from here that the main objection is only at the beginning of a book, out of respect for the book, but in the continuation of the book there is no issue. Thus we can explain that the Torah only needed to allude to the sins at the beginning of the book, because it did not wish to begin with the disgrace of Israel, and therefore had to only hint to them. However, later in the book, there is no problem with stating the sins explicitly.
With this chidush we can also understand the Talmud in the beginning of Pesachim (3a). There it explains that a person should always speak using clean and respectable language, and they learn this from the language in the Torah in parshat Noach. It says there (Berieshis 7: 5) “From the animals that are pure and form the animals that are not pure even though the Torah could have used fewer words and simply written ‘the impure animals’. This is because ‘impure’ is not dignified language. Rashi explains that even though the Torah uses the word ‘impure’ several times, here the Torah changed its language to teach us that we should always try and use clean language.
Rashi’s explanation requires elaboration. Based on what we have said above, that being particular about clean and decent language is only the at the beginning of a book. This verse in Noach is the first time that the concepts of pure and impure appear, therefore the Torah wrote it using clean language, as the first time.
Also there in Pesachim it says; It was taught in the house of Rabbi Yishmael that a person should always speak with clean language. It explains there that for this reason the Mishna uses the word ‘ohr’ (light) to mean evening (in the evening of the fourteenth) rather than the word ‘lail’, because ‘light’ is a nicer way of saying it than ‘night’, which is language of darkness an depression, like we find in creation ‘He called the darkness ‘night’.” And also in Tehillim (104: 20) “Darkness comes and it is night”.
However later in the gemara (7b) it uses that word explicitly – ‘It was taught in the house of Rabbi Yishmael that on the night of the fourteenth we check for chametz…’. It seems as though the house of Rabbi Yishmael are contradicting themselves, first they say that we must use nice language – ‘light’ instead of ‘night’, and then they themselves use the word ‘night’ of the fourteenth. How can we reconcile these two?
The explanation is that when one learns in depth in the middle of a book, there is no obligation to use the nicest language (provided, of course, that it is not crass or foul language), since the mind is involved in learning deeply, and is not able to think of nice words. However at the beginning of a book, at the beginning of the first Mishna, it is required. Out of honour for the beginning of the book it is appropriate to search for the best language – ‘light’ of the fourteenth. But when the house of Rabbi Yishmael were involved in the intricacies of the halacha, they were not particular on their language and used ‘night’ of the fourteenth.
If goes without saying that if it is possible to do both – to learn in depth and use good language, certainly that is the best. That is the basis of the proof there from the language of ‘riding’ and ‘sitting’ regarding a zav and zava. The Mishna uses ‘sitting’ instead of ‘riding’ when speaking about a zava because it is better language to say ‘sitting’ regarding a female.
Sunday, July 08, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Pinchas
Complete Forgiveness
“Therefore say, ‘behold I give to him My covenant of peace” (25; 12)
In Torah Temima we asked, why did Pinchas merit to receive this reward of becoming a Cohen more than Moshe. We find that Moshe also removed G-d’s anger from Israel, both at the time of the golden calf and the time of the spies. It is written in the verse after the golden calf, after Moshe’s prayer – “And G-d relented on the evil which He had spoken to do to His people” (Ki Tissa, Shemot 32; 14). And after the spies – “I have forgiven” (Shelach, Bamidbar 14; 20). Despite this, Moshe never received a covenant of peace from G-d as a reward, unlike Pinchas. This needs explanation.
We explained tat Moshe did not completely remove the anger totally and forever. He only effected a temporary forgiveness, but did not remove the root and cause of the anger. We find this after G-d has forgiven the sin of the calf, “On the day that I will visit (punishment) I will revisit their sin” (Ki Tissa, Shemot 32; 34). In the Talmud (Sanhedrin 102a) it says: every tragedy that befalls the Jewish people contains within it part of the punishment for the sin of the calf. So we see that the sin was not erased completely and things were not like they were before. Similarly with the spies, after G-d says “I have forgiven”, He adds “Nevertheless, I swear that none of these people will see the land…” (Shelach Bamidbar 14; 23). On the verse that says “the people cried on that night” (14; 1), the Sages say: G-d said, ‘they cried for no reason. I will give them a reason to cry for all generations’ (referring to the ninth of Av, the date of the destruction of the Temple – Ta’anit 29a). We see that in both cases, the calf and the spies, the anger still remains, somewhat muted and restrained. Pinchas, however, removed the anger entirely. He uprooted it entirely so that there was no trace left for the future. Therefore he merited his reward.
Based on this explanation we can understand the wording of the prayer ‘Avinu Malkeinu’ in which we say ‘forgive us and pardon us for all our sins’. We also say ‘destroy the evil decree against us’. It is not clear why we need the repetition of the same idea. Forgiving and pardoning is the same as destroying the evil decree. Through forgiveness everything should return to its original state (with no decree).
Based on our explanation, even after the forgiveness and pardon, it is possible that there still remains a trace of the sin for the future. This is what we find in the forgiveness for both the sins of the golden calf and the spies, as we explained. Therefore we pray that not only should we receive forgiveness and pardon, but we also request that the decree should be destroyed, like a loan document if the lender forgives the borrower the loan. Until the loan document is destroyed, the mind of the borrower is still concerned lest he only be given a temporary stay and the loan is not forgiven completely. As long as the document still exists the money can still be claimed. Once it is ripped up it loses its validity forever. This is the meaning of the prayer – we ask that G-d tear up the decree against us even after He has forgiven us for the sin.
“Therefore say, ‘behold I give to him My covenant of peace” (25; 12)
In Torah Temima we asked, why did Pinchas merit to receive this reward of becoming a Cohen more than Moshe. We find that Moshe also removed G-d’s anger from Israel, both at the time of the golden calf and the time of the spies. It is written in the verse after the golden calf, after Moshe’s prayer – “And G-d relented on the evil which He had spoken to do to His people” (Ki Tissa, Shemot 32; 14). And after the spies – “I have forgiven” (Shelach, Bamidbar 14; 20). Despite this, Moshe never received a covenant of peace from G-d as a reward, unlike Pinchas. This needs explanation.
We explained tat Moshe did not completely remove the anger totally and forever. He only effected a temporary forgiveness, but did not remove the root and cause of the anger. We find this after G-d has forgiven the sin of the calf, “On the day that I will visit (punishment) I will revisit their sin” (Ki Tissa, Shemot 32; 34). In the Talmud (Sanhedrin 102a) it says: every tragedy that befalls the Jewish people contains within it part of the punishment for the sin of the calf. So we see that the sin was not erased completely and things were not like they were before. Similarly with the spies, after G-d says “I have forgiven”, He adds “Nevertheless, I swear that none of these people will see the land…” (Shelach Bamidbar 14; 23). On the verse that says “the people cried on that night” (14; 1), the Sages say: G-d said, ‘they cried for no reason. I will give them a reason to cry for all generations’ (referring to the ninth of Av, the date of the destruction of the Temple – Ta’anit 29a). We see that in both cases, the calf and the spies, the anger still remains, somewhat muted and restrained. Pinchas, however, removed the anger entirely. He uprooted it entirely so that there was no trace left for the future. Therefore he merited his reward.
Based on this explanation we can understand the wording of the prayer ‘Avinu Malkeinu’ in which we say ‘forgive us and pardon us for all our sins’. We also say ‘destroy the evil decree against us’. It is not clear why we need the repetition of the same idea. Forgiving and pardoning is the same as destroying the evil decree. Through forgiveness everything should return to its original state (with no decree).
Based on our explanation, even after the forgiveness and pardon, it is possible that there still remains a trace of the sin for the future. This is what we find in the forgiveness for both the sins of the golden calf and the spies, as we explained. Therefore we pray that not only should we receive forgiveness and pardon, but we also request that the decree should be destroyed, like a loan document if the lender forgives the borrower the loan. Until the loan document is destroyed, the mind of the borrower is still concerned lest he only be given a temporary stay and the loan is not forgiven completely. As long as the document still exists the money can still be claimed. Once it is ripped up it loses its validity forever. This is the meaning of the prayer – we ask that G-d tear up the decree against us even after He has forgiven us for the sin.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Balak
“go and curse for me this people” (23; 6)
We must ask the question, why was Balak so anxious to bring Bilaam to him to curse the Israelites? He send messengers two or three times, and offered money and got angry. Why didn’t Balak simply ask Bilaam to curse the Israelites from where he was? We find many curses and cursers who were able to do damage without seeing the object of the curse. For example, when the Israelites came into Israel they gave the curses and blessings on the two mountains of Bracha and Eival [despite the fact that the people they were cursing – those who don’t keep the mitzvot – were not present]. Similarly, in Kohelet it states “even in your tears don’t curse a king and even in your private room don’t curse a rich person” (10; 2). This clearly refers to a curse not in the presence of the object of the curse.
Perhaps we can answer based on the Talmud (Brachot 7a) which explains the verse in Tehillim (7; 12) “G-d is angry every day”. How long is His anger? A ‘moment’. And a ‘moment’ lasts for 1/8888th of an hour. Bilaam was the only person who knew when this time was.
Tosefot asks, what could Bilaam have said in that fraction of a second that would have any effect? They answer that he would have enough time to say the word(s) ‘destroy them’ (‘kalem’). More than this and he would have run out of time.
Therefore we can understand why Balak had to bring Bilaam to the place where the Israelites were encamped, so that he could point to them and say ‘destroy them’. This could only be said when he could see them because otherwise there would be no ‘them’ for the curse to fall on.
We find a similar concept when praying for a sick person. The Halacha is that if one is praying in the presence of the patient there is no need to mention his or her name, only the request. We find the source for this with Moshe’s prayer for Miriam (which was in her presence) when he only said “G-d, please heal her”, without saying her name. In contrast, when Ya’akov prayed that G-d should save him from his brother (and was not yet in his presence) he said “save me please, from my brother, from Esav”.
However Tosefot also gives another answer to his question in Brachot. He says that if Bilaam could begin the curse in that moment, it would remain effective even while he finished saying the words of his curse. According to this answer we are back to our original question of why Balak was so desperate to bring Bilaam to him.
Perhaps we can answer based on the Mishna in Pirkei Avot (5; 19) that Bilaam was known for his evil eye (and as explained in more detail in the Zohar)s. His power was in his eye, and anywhere that he ‘put his eye’ was damaged. Therefore he had to come to a place where he could see the camp of the Israelites in order to put his evil eye on them.
We must ask the question, why was Balak so anxious to bring Bilaam to him to curse the Israelites? He send messengers two or three times, and offered money and got angry. Why didn’t Balak simply ask Bilaam to curse the Israelites from where he was? We find many curses and cursers who were able to do damage without seeing the object of the curse. For example, when the Israelites came into Israel they gave the curses and blessings on the two mountains of Bracha and Eival [despite the fact that the people they were cursing – those who don’t keep the mitzvot – were not present]. Similarly, in Kohelet it states “even in your tears don’t curse a king and even in your private room don’t curse a rich person” (10; 2). This clearly refers to a curse not in the presence of the object of the curse.
Perhaps we can answer based on the Talmud (Brachot 7a) which explains the verse in Tehillim (7; 12) “G-d is angry every day”. How long is His anger? A ‘moment’. And a ‘moment’ lasts for 1/8888th of an hour. Bilaam was the only person who knew when this time was.
Tosefot asks, what could Bilaam have said in that fraction of a second that would have any effect? They answer that he would have enough time to say the word(s) ‘destroy them’ (‘kalem’). More than this and he would have run out of time.
Therefore we can understand why Balak had to bring Bilaam to the place where the Israelites were encamped, so that he could point to them and say ‘destroy them’. This could only be said when he could see them because otherwise there would be no ‘them’ for the curse to fall on.
We find a similar concept when praying for a sick person. The Halacha is that if one is praying in the presence of the patient there is no need to mention his or her name, only the request. We find the source for this with Moshe’s prayer for Miriam (which was in her presence) when he only said “G-d, please heal her”, without saying her name. In contrast, when Ya’akov prayed that G-d should save him from his brother (and was not yet in his presence) he said “save me please, from my brother, from Esav”.
However Tosefot also gives another answer to his question in Brachot. He says that if Bilaam could begin the curse in that moment, it would remain effective even while he finished saying the words of his curse. According to this answer we are back to our original question of why Balak was so desperate to bring Bilaam to him.
Perhaps we can answer based on the Mishna in Pirkei Avot (5; 19) that Bilaam was known for his evil eye (and as explained in more detail in the Zohar)s. His power was in his eye, and anywhere that he ‘put his eye’ was damaged. Therefore he had to come to a place where he could see the camp of the Israelites in order to put his evil eye on them.
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Chukat
“You should take for yourself a red heifer…” (19; 2)
It is not exactly clear what the word(s) ‘for yourself’ mean. In Parshat Tetzaveh where it states “You shall take olive oil for yourself” the Sages explain what it means. Here there is no explanation.
I found in the Yalkut here the following drasha:
G-d said to Moshe, ‘to you I will reveal the reason of the red heifer but for everyone else it will be a statute.
In other words, [G-d told Moshe] not to reveal the reason for the red heifer to anyone else so that is should remain a statute without explanation. This itself requires explanation, why should G-d be strict not to reveal the reason? There must be a reason for this.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Talmud (Brachot 9b) on the verse in parshat Shemot, “G-d said to Moshe ‘I will be that I will be’. G-d said to Moshe, ‘go and tell Israel that just as I was with them in the past during this slavery, so I will be with them in the future exiles’.” Moshe said back, ‘Master of the Universe, one suffering at a time is enough for them (in other words, why tell them now about future exiles to cause them pain?). G-d agreed with him, and said to Moshe that he should just tell them that ‘I will be’ sent me to you, and not ‘I will be as I will be’. He didn’t want to tell them about the future exiles, as we have explained.
The Yalkut here says that the red heifer hints at all the future exiles coming in later times. The word ‘heifer’ hints at Egypt, which is called “a beautiful calf” (Yeremiyahu 46; 20). ‘Red’ refers to Bavel, as the verse states “it is the head of gold, and the gold was red” (referring to Bavel). ‘Pure’ refers to Madai, because the kings of Madai were pure, who didn’t have their own idols to worship, apart from those they inherited from their ancestors. ‘That has no blemish’ refers to Greece. Alexander of Macedonia blessed G-d with his whole being. ‘That has never had a yoke on it’ refers to Nevuchadnezzar who didn’t accept the yoke of Heave and said “Who challenges me from the Heavens” (Tehillim 73; 25).
Therefore, based on Moshe’s claim that we brought earlier, to which G-d agreed, he should not reveal the pain that would happen to Israel in the future exiles, So regarding the red heifer, which hints at the future exiles, He said to him, ‘only to you will I reveal the reason, but for them it must remain a statute’ – so that they will not be pained. Look also at what we have written on parshat Bo (12; 13 and 13; 7).
It is not exactly clear what the word(s) ‘for yourself’ mean. In Parshat Tetzaveh where it states “You shall take olive oil for yourself” the Sages explain what it means. Here there is no explanation.
I found in the Yalkut here the following drasha:
G-d said to Moshe, ‘to you I will reveal the reason of the red heifer but for everyone else it will be a statute.
In other words, [G-d told Moshe] not to reveal the reason for the red heifer to anyone else so that is should remain a statute without explanation. This itself requires explanation, why should G-d be strict not to reveal the reason? There must be a reason for this.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Talmud (Brachot 9b) on the verse in parshat Shemot, “G-d said to Moshe ‘I will be that I will be’. G-d said to Moshe, ‘go and tell Israel that just as I was with them in the past during this slavery, so I will be with them in the future exiles’.” Moshe said back, ‘Master of the Universe, one suffering at a time is enough for them (in other words, why tell them now about future exiles to cause them pain?). G-d agreed with him, and said to Moshe that he should just tell them that ‘I will be’ sent me to you, and not ‘I will be as I will be’. He didn’t want to tell them about the future exiles, as we have explained.
The Yalkut here says that the red heifer hints at all the future exiles coming in later times. The word ‘heifer’ hints at Egypt, which is called “a beautiful calf” (Yeremiyahu 46; 20). ‘Red’ refers to Bavel, as the verse states “it is the head of gold, and the gold was red” (referring to Bavel). ‘Pure’ refers to Madai, because the kings of Madai were pure, who didn’t have their own idols to worship, apart from those they inherited from their ancestors. ‘That has no blemish’ refers to Greece. Alexander of Macedonia blessed G-d with his whole being. ‘That has never had a yoke on it’ refers to Nevuchadnezzar who didn’t accept the yoke of Heave and said “Who challenges me from the Heavens” (Tehillim 73; 25).
Therefore, based on Moshe’s claim that we brought earlier, to which G-d agreed, he should not reveal the pain that would happen to Israel in the future exiles, So regarding the red heifer, which hints at the future exiles, He said to him, ‘only to you will I reveal the reason, but for them it must remain a statute’ – so that they will not be pained. Look also at what we have written on parshat Bo (12; 13 and 13; 7).
Sunday, June 03, 2007
Tosefet Bracha Shelach Lecha part 2
"Moshe called Hoshea bin Nun - Yehoshua” (13; 16)
Rashi explains here, based on the midrash, that Moshe's intention in changing his name was to add a 'yud' to the 'heh' so that it would spell G-d's name, and as if to say 'G-d should save you from the advice of the spies' (because Moshe saw in a vision that it was posssible that the spies would sin, and he prayed that it shouldn't happen). We have to explain why Moshe prayed for Yehoshua more than for all the other spies, that he should be saved from speaking lashon hara and saying bad things about the land of Israel.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Midrash Rabba in parshat Vayeshev (end of section 86) regarding the nature of people. 'Throw a stick to the ground and it will return to where it came from'. This is an analogy to people who inherit their behaviour patterns from their parents. Like we find in the Midrash Rabba, Parshat Miketz, that when the goblet was found in the sack of Binyamin, and the brothers thought that he had stolen it, they all called him 'thief, the son of a thief'. They thought he was following in the footsteps of his mother who had stolen the idols from her father (Vayetze 31; 32). We also find this as a common saying amongst people, 'the lamb follows the ewe, the actions of the daughter are like the actions of the mother' (Ketubot 63a). Also in Yechezkel (16; 44) we find “the daughter is like the mother”.
We know that Yehoshua was from the tribe of Ephraim ben Yosef. Yosef had the attribute of speaking badly about others, like we find at the beginning of parshat Vayeshev (37; 2) “Yosef brought evil reports (about his brothers) to his father”. Therefore Moshe was concerned that this attribute might be part of Yehoshua's genetic makeup. Since he was so close to him as his student, Moshe prayed for him in particular, like for something which is likely to cause damage [which explains why he didn't also pray for Gadi ben Sussi from the tribe of Menashe, who was also descended from Yosef.]
We gave a similar explanation to something which we find many times in the Talmud. When Rav Yosef was amazed about something he would say 'Master of Avraham' (for example look in Shabbat 22a, and the other places listed there). We don't find anyone else who used this expression, nor is it explained why Rav Yosef chose this phrase to express his surprise or amazement, or why it was unique to him.
Perhaps we can explain based on what the Ran brings in Kiddushin (chapter one on the Talmud 31a) in the name of an aggada. That Rav Yosef was careful not to look outside of his immediate four amot. For this purpose he damaged his eyes [which eventually led to him becoming blind]. This trait of never looking outside the four amot was also a trait of Avraham. Like Rashi explains in parshat Lech Lecha on the verse “Now I know that you are beautiful” [that until that moment Avraham had not noticed how beautiful Sarah, his wife, was]. Also in the Midrash Rabba on Vayera (parshat 53) they said that he fulfilled the verse “close his eyes from seeing evil” (Yishiya 33; 15). Because of this trait of not looking at things away from himself, he didn't notice the actions of Yishmael. Therefore Rav Yosef had the same trait as Avraham, and therefore used this expression of surprise 'Master of Avraham'.
We also explained similarly the Talmud in Chagiga 14b, which tells of Rabbi Elazar ben Erech who expounded upon kabbalistic secrets of the nature of G-d. After he finished, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai stood up and kissed him on his head, and said, 'Blessed is G-d who gave such a son to Avraham our father'. He meant this same idea, because we know from midrashim that Avraham explored these kinds of ideas, and as explained by Rambam at the beginning of his laws of idolatry. Therefore he connected Elazar ben Erech to Avraham because he followed in his footsteps.
Rashi explains here, based on the midrash, that Moshe's intention in changing his name was to add a 'yud' to the 'heh' so that it would spell G-d's name, and as if to say 'G-d should save you from the advice of the spies' (because Moshe saw in a vision that it was posssible that the spies would sin, and he prayed that it shouldn't happen). We have to explain why Moshe prayed for Yehoshua more than for all the other spies, that he should be saved from speaking lashon hara and saying bad things about the land of Israel.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Midrash Rabba in parshat Vayeshev (end of section 86) regarding the nature of people. 'Throw a stick to the ground and it will return to where it came from'. This is an analogy to people who inherit their behaviour patterns from their parents. Like we find in the Midrash Rabba, Parshat Miketz, that when the goblet was found in the sack of Binyamin, and the brothers thought that he had stolen it, they all called him 'thief, the son of a thief'. They thought he was following in the footsteps of his mother who had stolen the idols from her father (Vayetze 31; 32). We also find this as a common saying amongst people, 'the lamb follows the ewe, the actions of the daughter are like the actions of the mother' (Ketubot 63a). Also in Yechezkel (16; 44) we find “the daughter is like the mother”.
We know that Yehoshua was from the tribe of Ephraim ben Yosef. Yosef had the attribute of speaking badly about others, like we find at the beginning of parshat Vayeshev (37; 2) “Yosef brought evil reports (about his brothers) to his father”. Therefore Moshe was concerned that this attribute might be part of Yehoshua's genetic makeup. Since he was so close to him as his student, Moshe prayed for him in particular, like for something which is likely to cause damage [which explains why he didn't also pray for Gadi ben Sussi from the tribe of Menashe, who was also descended from Yosef.]
We gave a similar explanation to something which we find many times in the Talmud. When Rav Yosef was amazed about something he would say 'Master of Avraham' (for example look in Shabbat 22a, and the other places listed there). We don't find anyone else who used this expression, nor is it explained why Rav Yosef chose this phrase to express his surprise or amazement, or why it was unique to him.
Perhaps we can explain based on what the Ran brings in Kiddushin (chapter one on the Talmud 31a) in the name of an aggada. That Rav Yosef was careful not to look outside of his immediate four amot. For this purpose he damaged his eyes [which eventually led to him becoming blind]. This trait of never looking outside the four amot was also a trait of Avraham. Like Rashi explains in parshat Lech Lecha on the verse “Now I know that you are beautiful” [that until that moment Avraham had not noticed how beautiful Sarah, his wife, was]. Also in the Midrash Rabba on Vayera (parshat 53) they said that he fulfilled the verse “close his eyes from seeing evil” (Yishiya 33; 15). Because of this trait of not looking at things away from himself, he didn't notice the actions of Yishmael. Therefore Rav Yosef had the same trait as Avraham, and therefore used this expression of surprise 'Master of Avraham'.
We also explained similarly the Talmud in Chagiga 14b, which tells of Rabbi Elazar ben Erech who expounded upon kabbalistic secrets of the nature of G-d. After he finished, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai stood up and kissed him on his head, and said, 'Blessed is G-d who gave such a son to Avraham our father'. He meant this same idea, because we know from midrashim that Avraham explored these kinds of ideas, and as explained by Rambam at the beginning of his laws of idolatry. Therefore he connected Elazar ben Erech to Avraham because he followed in his footsteps.
Tosefet Bracha Shelach Lecha part 1
"Send for yourself men” (13; 2)
Rashi points out the reason that the story of the spies follows immediately after the story of Miriam (at the end of Beha'alotecha), since they both speak about lashon hara.
It is not clear to me why Rashi has to point this out. There are many sections of the Torah that we never ask about the reason for their juxtaposition, so why does Rashi need to say anything here?
Perhaps we can say that this juxtaposition requires particular explanation, based on the Talmud in Shabbat (116a) that it is not correct to put two bad topics next to each other. Here we have the tragedy of the spies immediately after the tragedy of Miriam, and this requires explanation. Therefore Rashi explains that they both deal with the same topic of lashon hara.
"Moshe called Hoshea bin Nun - Yehoshua” (13; 16)
We must point out that every time in the Torah and Nach that the word 'ben' appears it has three dots (segol) under the 'bet'. However, every time it says Yehoshua's name there is only one dot (chirik) so that it is read as 'bin'. This is strange. There must be some special reason for this unusual vocalisation.
There is only one other time that the word 'bin' is used, and that is in Mishlei (30; 1) “These are the words of Agur, son of (bin) Yakeh...” when the 'bet' also has a chirik. [There is also another time in Parshat Ki Tetzei, Devarim 15; 2, but there it doesn't mean 'son', so perhaps that is why the author doesn't mention it.] The Sages have discussed this in the midrash, and explained it aggadically (metaphorically) in Shemot Rabba Parshat Va'era section 6. However the explanation there has no relevance to the verse here. The Sages appear to say nothing at all about our case. Nor have any of the commentaries discussed it, and this is extremely strange.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Talmud (Sanhedrin 107a) and midrashim that say that the 'yud' that was taken from Sarai (after he name was changed to Sarah) complained about being removed from the Torah. It was only consoled when Moshe took it and added it to Hoshea's name to make Yehoshua (by adding a 'yud'). In this way the 'yud' that was removed from Sarai was replaced into the Torah.
This Talmud still leaves a difficulty, because even though Moshe found the 'yud' to add to Hoshea's name, where did he find the vowel to go under it? The 'yud' from Sarai had no vowel under it, whereas the 'yud' of Yehoshua has a 'sheva', which is two dots. We know that the number of dots in the Torah is precise and exact, so how could Moshe add two dots to the 'yud'? Therefore he had to remove the two dots from the 'bet' of 'ben' and replaced the 'segol' with a 'chirik'. This left two dots extra which were used for the 'yud'.
Even though this explanation is subtle and unusual, nevertheless, because of the uniqueness of the vocalisation of this word you should accept it.
[This doesn't explain why he was called Hoshea 'bin' Nun before Moshe added the 'yud' (verse 8) – perhaps the 'segol' was already removed in advance of the name change?]
Rashi points out the reason that the story of the spies follows immediately after the story of Miriam (at the end of Beha'alotecha), since they both speak about lashon hara.
It is not clear to me why Rashi has to point this out. There are many sections of the Torah that we never ask about the reason for their juxtaposition, so why does Rashi need to say anything here?
Perhaps we can say that this juxtaposition requires particular explanation, based on the Talmud in Shabbat (116a) that it is not correct to put two bad topics next to each other. Here we have the tragedy of the spies immediately after the tragedy of Miriam, and this requires explanation. Therefore Rashi explains that they both deal with the same topic of lashon hara.
"Moshe called Hoshea bin Nun - Yehoshua” (13; 16)
We must point out that every time in the Torah and Nach that the word 'ben' appears it has three dots (segol) under the 'bet'. However, every time it says Yehoshua's name there is only one dot (chirik) so that it is read as 'bin'. This is strange. There must be some special reason for this unusual vocalisation.
There is only one other time that the word 'bin' is used, and that is in Mishlei (30; 1) “These are the words of Agur, son of (bin) Yakeh...” when the 'bet' also has a chirik. [There is also another time in Parshat Ki Tetzei, Devarim 15; 2, but there it doesn't mean 'son', so perhaps that is why the author doesn't mention it.] The Sages have discussed this in the midrash, and explained it aggadically (metaphorically) in Shemot Rabba Parshat Va'era section 6. However the explanation there has no relevance to the verse here. The Sages appear to say nothing at all about our case. Nor have any of the commentaries discussed it, and this is extremely strange.
Perhaps we can explain based on the Talmud (Sanhedrin 107a) and midrashim that say that the 'yud' that was taken from Sarai (after he name was changed to Sarah) complained about being removed from the Torah. It was only consoled when Moshe took it and added it to Hoshea's name to make Yehoshua (by adding a 'yud'). In this way the 'yud' that was removed from Sarai was replaced into the Torah.
This Talmud still leaves a difficulty, because even though Moshe found the 'yud' to add to Hoshea's name, where did he find the vowel to go under it? The 'yud' from Sarai had no vowel under it, whereas the 'yud' of Yehoshua has a 'sheva', which is two dots. We know that the number of dots in the Torah is precise and exact, so how could Moshe add two dots to the 'yud'? Therefore he had to remove the two dots from the 'bet' of 'ben' and replaced the 'segol' with a 'chirik'. This left two dots extra which were used for the 'yud'.
Even though this explanation is subtle and unusual, nevertheless, because of the uniqueness of the vocalisation of this word you should accept it.
[This doesn't explain why he was called Hoshea 'bin' Nun before Moshe added the 'yud' (verse 8) – perhaps the 'segol' was already removed in advance of the name change?]
Wednesday, May 02, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Emor
Making use of a Cohen
“And you shall make him holy” (21; 5)
The Talmud Yerushalmi says on this verse (Brachot 8; 5) that it is forbidden to make use of a cohen, and one who does so is considered as if they used things sanctified to the Temple.
However, since it is very difficult in practice to keep this law, since there are many cohanim and their families who rely on serving others for their livelihood (as workers, servants, or retailers). Therefore the poskim have ruled that if a cohen receives pay for his work, it is possible for him to forego his honour. The sanctity of the cohen cannot be greater than this, because the money that he earns is like a redemption for the Temple item (certain Temple items can be redeemed for money and lose their holy status in the process).
We find that even Sages of the Talmud would have oaid servants who were cohanim (look in Chulin 133a)
Furthermore we find that the Sages were not specific that it has to be a tangible gain for the cohen, for example paying him money, but even if he receives a spiritual gain one is able to make use of the cohen. We find in Bava Kamma 20a that Rav Chisda asked a certain Sage for the source of a particular Halacha that he didn’t know. The Sage replied with the condition that Rav Chisda must first serve him in some way. (Rav Chisda placed a turban on his head, to show that he was accepting him as his teacher temporarily). It is known that Rav Chisda was a cohen (look in Shabbat 10b). So we see that even for a spiritual gain of learning Torah it is permitted to make use of a cohen.
Furthermore, from here we can say that even if there is no physical or spiritual benefit, but it suits the cohen to serve, it is permitted for him. It is well known that just as it is forbidden to make use of a cohen it is also forbidden to make use of a Talmid Chacham. This is the meaning of the Mishna (Pirkei Avot 1; 7) ‘One who makes use of the crown (of Torah) will depart from the world’. Also in Megillah (28b) they said that it is forbidden to make use of someone who has learnt Mishna. Even so, the gemara there brings an incident with Reish Lakish who needed to ford a river, and someone came and carried him across the river on his shoulders. Reish Lakish asked him if he had ever learnt chumash or Mishna, and the man replied that he had. Reish Lakish was very upset that he had made use of a Talmid Chacham. The man said to him ‘it is good for me to be of service to the master’. It is explained there that Reish Lakish accepted his answer, and was no longer upset. It seems from here that even if a person is happy to be made use of, that is also considered some kind of reward, and is permitted. Perhaps we can extend this concept also to making use of a cohen.
Even though this reasoning is only said about a talmid chacham and not a regular person, it may apply also to a cohen. The Talmud (Kiddushin 33b) says that someone who is involved in good deeds is also considered like a talmid chacham (in regards to standing up before them, and giving them honour), so perhaps we can extend it to a cohen.
Some people want to bring a proof that it is permitted to make use of a cohen from the halacha that the slave who is a cohen does not get his ear pierced (if he wishes to extend his servitude beyond the seven years), because it would blemish him (Bechorot 37b). It is clear from this that a cohan can be a slave.
However the truth is that this is not a good proof, because it is known that piercing the ear is only for a slave that was sold by the Beit Din because he was a thief who could not repay what he stole. For the pay that he earns as a slave he pays back the theft. But someone who sells themselves does not have their ear pierced. Since this Talmud is only talking about a thief, therefore he has cheapened his cohanic status through his actions and the prohibition of making use of a cohen would no longer apply.
From everything we have explained, it is very painful to read that one of the greatest poskim (the kinesset hagedolah) gives a harsh ruling on this matter. He writes (OC hagahot Beit Yosef 31): Experience teaches us that someone who makes use of a cohen will not see any blessing in that thing.
From his words it implies that even if the cohen receives pay for his work it won’t help. This is a very difficult ruling, but its status is doubtful.
“And you shall make him holy” (21; 5)
The Talmud Yerushalmi says on this verse (Brachot 8; 5) that it is forbidden to make use of a cohen, and one who does so is considered as if they used things sanctified to the Temple.
However, since it is very difficult in practice to keep this law, since there are many cohanim and their families who rely on serving others for their livelihood (as workers, servants, or retailers). Therefore the poskim have ruled that if a cohen receives pay for his work, it is possible for him to forego his honour. The sanctity of the cohen cannot be greater than this, because the money that he earns is like a redemption for the Temple item (certain Temple items can be redeemed for money and lose their holy status in the process).
We find that even Sages of the Talmud would have oaid servants who were cohanim (look in Chulin 133a)
Furthermore we find that the Sages were not specific that it has to be a tangible gain for the cohen, for example paying him money, but even if he receives a spiritual gain one is able to make use of the cohen. We find in Bava Kamma 20a that Rav Chisda asked a certain Sage for the source of a particular Halacha that he didn’t know. The Sage replied with the condition that Rav Chisda must first serve him in some way. (Rav Chisda placed a turban on his head, to show that he was accepting him as his teacher temporarily). It is known that Rav Chisda was a cohen (look in Shabbat 10b). So we see that even for a spiritual gain of learning Torah it is permitted to make use of a cohen.
Furthermore, from here we can say that even if there is no physical or spiritual benefit, but it suits the cohen to serve, it is permitted for him. It is well known that just as it is forbidden to make use of a cohen it is also forbidden to make use of a Talmid Chacham. This is the meaning of the Mishna (Pirkei Avot 1; 7) ‘One who makes use of the crown (of Torah) will depart from the world’. Also in Megillah (28b) they said that it is forbidden to make use of someone who has learnt Mishna. Even so, the gemara there brings an incident with Reish Lakish who needed to ford a river, and someone came and carried him across the river on his shoulders. Reish Lakish asked him if he had ever learnt chumash or Mishna, and the man replied that he had. Reish Lakish was very upset that he had made use of a Talmid Chacham. The man said to him ‘it is good for me to be of service to the master’. It is explained there that Reish Lakish accepted his answer, and was no longer upset. It seems from here that even if a person is happy to be made use of, that is also considered some kind of reward, and is permitted. Perhaps we can extend this concept also to making use of a cohen.
Even though this reasoning is only said about a talmid chacham and not a regular person, it may apply also to a cohen. The Talmud (Kiddushin 33b) says that someone who is involved in good deeds is also considered like a talmid chacham (in regards to standing up before them, and giving them honour), so perhaps we can extend it to a cohen.
Some people want to bring a proof that it is permitted to make use of a cohen from the halacha that the slave who is a cohen does not get his ear pierced (if he wishes to extend his servitude beyond the seven years), because it would blemish him (Bechorot 37b). It is clear from this that a cohan can be a slave.
However the truth is that this is not a good proof, because it is known that piercing the ear is only for a slave that was sold by the Beit Din because he was a thief who could not repay what he stole. For the pay that he earns as a slave he pays back the theft. But someone who sells themselves does not have their ear pierced. Since this Talmud is only talking about a thief, therefore he has cheapened his cohanic status through his actions and the prohibition of making use of a cohen would no longer apply.
From everything we have explained, it is very painful to read that one of the greatest poskim (the kinesset hagedolah) gives a harsh ruling on this matter. He writes (OC hagahot Beit Yosef 31): Experience teaches us that someone who makes use of a cohen will not see any blessing in that thing.
From his words it implies that even if the cohen receives pay for his work it won’t help. This is a very difficult ruling, but its status is doubtful.
Sunday, April 29, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Acharei Mot
“You shall afflict your souls” (16; 31)
Several times in the Talmud it teaches the well known drasha: If someomne eats and drinks on the ninth (of Tishrei – the day before Yom Kippur) it is considered as if he has fasted on both the ninth and the tenth.
The reason for this drasha is not clear, why should there be such a great reward for eating and drinking such that it is considered like fasting on Yom Kippur? Rashi takes it a step further and says (Rosh Hashana 9a) that anyone who eats a lot and drinks a lot …. This just makes it more confusing and we have to figure out why this should be true.
Perhas we can explain based on the Mishna in Ta’anit (26a) that the anshei mishmar (the representatives from each town who went to the Temple in shifts to ‘supervise’ the sacrifices) would sit and learn constantly in the Beit Hamikdash and would dedicate their learning and the sacrifices to all of Israel. They would fast every day of the week except for Sunday. The Talmud explains the reason for not fasting on Sunday, so that they should not go directly from the rest and enjoyment of Shabbat into fasting, which may weaken them significantly and endanger their lives. The conept of dying refers here to the weakening of the body, just as the phrase ‘the Torah will only be acquired properly by someone who ‘kills’ themselves over it’ (Brachot 63b). This doesn’t mean actual killing, but weakening themselves, because if they would actually kill themselves over it that would certainly not be acquiring it at all. Once a person dies they become free from the Torah (as it says in Nida 61b). In the Talmud of Tamid (32a) it asks: what should a person do to live? Kill themselves (in other words humble themselves). There are many other examples of this use of the word ‘kill’ or ‘death’.
So the Mishna in Ta’anit means that on Shabbat a person spoils themselves with food and drink, as Rashi explains in Beitza (16a) regarding the extra soul of Shabbat. He says that the soul expands the ability of the heart to enjoy and be happy with food and drink without being repulsed by it. We can understand that ‘being repulsed’ teaches that the nature of a person is that when they have eaten their fill and there is no room left in their bellies, they lose their appetite for any more food and they become repulsed by it. But on Shabbat a person is able to eat and drink more without becoming ill from having eaten too much.
Therefore it is clear that a fast that comes straight after Shabbat is very difficult. This is why the anshei mishmar would not fast on Sunday. Similarly, the more one eats and drinks on the day before Yom Kippur, the more difficult it is for them to fast on Yom Kippur. This is why it is praiseworthy to eat and drink on the ninth and it is considered as if they had fasted. The difficulty of the subsequent fast is considered like a double fast. We can see that Rashi was very precise when he said ‘eats and drinks a lot’, because it is the extra food that makes the fast more difficult.
You should know that based on this explanation we can understand the statement of the Talmud (Brachot 34b) that in a place where ba’alei Teshuva stand completely righteous people are unable to stand. At first glance it seems difficult to understand why someone who has sinned should be on a higher level than someone who has not. The sinner has sated their body and soul with sins and all kinds of forbidden things – how can they reach a higher level than someone who has never sinned but lived their life in purity and holiness?
According to our explanation above, we can explain that the higher level of someone who has sinned and done Teshuva is precisely because they have filled themselves with the pleasures of sin and physical desires. This makes it much more difficult for them to separate themselves from the physicality. To make the transition from a lifestyle of hedonism to the ‘afflictions’ and ‘suffering’ of keeping the mitzvot makes them much greater than those who were completely righteous all of their lives. (based on Rashi who explains (Succah 52a) that the word ‘chasid’ refers to someone who has never sinned in their life). Therefore the challenge of someone who becomes a ba’al Teshuva is much greater and their reward is similarly much greater.
Several times in the Talmud it teaches the well known drasha: If someomne eats and drinks on the ninth (of Tishrei – the day before Yom Kippur) it is considered as if he has fasted on both the ninth and the tenth.
The reason for this drasha is not clear, why should there be such a great reward for eating and drinking such that it is considered like fasting on Yom Kippur? Rashi takes it a step further and says (Rosh Hashana 9a) that anyone who eats a lot and drinks a lot …. This just makes it more confusing and we have to figure out why this should be true.
Perhas we can explain based on the Mishna in Ta’anit (26a) that the anshei mishmar (the representatives from each town who went to the Temple in shifts to ‘supervise’ the sacrifices) would sit and learn constantly in the Beit Hamikdash and would dedicate their learning and the sacrifices to all of Israel. They would fast every day of the week except for Sunday. The Talmud explains the reason for not fasting on Sunday, so that they should not go directly from the rest and enjoyment of Shabbat into fasting, which may weaken them significantly and endanger their lives. The conept of dying refers here to the weakening of the body, just as the phrase ‘the Torah will only be acquired properly by someone who ‘kills’ themselves over it’ (Brachot 63b). This doesn’t mean actual killing, but weakening themselves, because if they would actually kill themselves over it that would certainly not be acquiring it at all. Once a person dies they become free from the Torah (as it says in Nida 61b). In the Talmud of Tamid (32a) it asks: what should a person do to live? Kill themselves (in other words humble themselves). There are many other examples of this use of the word ‘kill’ or ‘death’.
So the Mishna in Ta’anit means that on Shabbat a person spoils themselves with food and drink, as Rashi explains in Beitza (16a) regarding the extra soul of Shabbat. He says that the soul expands the ability of the heart to enjoy and be happy with food and drink without being repulsed by it. We can understand that ‘being repulsed’ teaches that the nature of a person is that when they have eaten their fill and there is no room left in their bellies, they lose their appetite for any more food and they become repulsed by it. But on Shabbat a person is able to eat and drink more without becoming ill from having eaten too much.
Therefore it is clear that a fast that comes straight after Shabbat is very difficult. This is why the anshei mishmar would not fast on Sunday. Similarly, the more one eats and drinks on the day before Yom Kippur, the more difficult it is for them to fast on Yom Kippur. This is why it is praiseworthy to eat and drink on the ninth and it is considered as if they had fasted. The difficulty of the subsequent fast is considered like a double fast. We can see that Rashi was very precise when he said ‘eats and drinks a lot’, because it is the extra food that makes the fast more difficult.
You should know that based on this explanation we can understand the statement of the Talmud (Brachot 34b) that in a place where ba’alei Teshuva stand completely righteous people are unable to stand. At first glance it seems difficult to understand why someone who has sinned should be on a higher level than someone who has not. The sinner has sated their body and soul with sins and all kinds of forbidden things – how can they reach a higher level than someone who has never sinned but lived their life in purity and holiness?
According to our explanation above, we can explain that the higher level of someone who has sinned and done Teshuva is precisely because they have filled themselves with the pleasures of sin and physical desires. This makes it much more difficult for them to separate themselves from the physicality. To make the transition from a lifestyle of hedonism to the ‘afflictions’ and ‘suffering’ of keeping the mitzvot makes them much greater than those who were completely righteous all of their lives. (based on Rashi who explains (Succah 52a) that the word ‘chasid’ refers to someone who has never sinned in their life). Therefore the challenge of someone who becomes a ba’al Teshuva is much greater and their reward is similarly much greater.
Friday, April 20, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Metzora
Metzora
He will tell the Cohen saying, I have seen something like a plague in my house (14; 35)
Rashi explains that a person should not say that he has seen something which is definitely a plague in the house, but only ‘like a plague’. The source for Rashi is a Mishna in Negaim chapter 12 (Mishna 5). The commentaries there try to explain the reason for saying ‘like’ instead of definitely. Look at the Tosefot YomTov there (who brings many different explanations).
Perhaps we can explain the reason as follows. If the person would say that it is definitely a plague, he would be deciding the Halacha, that the house is certainly impure. Really this is a task that is given to the Cohen, to decide the status of the house. Sometimes there is a discolouration that look like a plague which are not, and it is the Cohen who is the expert in this. If the house owner decides the Halacha he is transgressing the prohibition of making a Halachic ruling in front of his teacher, and there is a great punishment associated with this (look in Eruvin 63a).
If so, we can better understand what the Rabbis taught in Torat Cohanim. It states there that the Cohen should give the owner of the house words of rebuke, and say, ‘my son, you should know that the plague only comes onto a house because of speaking lashon hara’. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says, ‘also because of pride’.
It is not clear why they chose only those two reasons for the plague, when the gemara in Erechin (16a) gives seven different reasons – what is special about these two?
We can explain based on the Talmud there (Erechin 16a). It was taught: Rabbi Elazar ben Parta says, ‘come and see how great is the sin of lashon hara. From where? From the spies (that Moshe sent to Israel). They only spoke badly about sticks and stones (as the Torah tells us in Shelach Lecha – “They spoke bad things about the land”). If the punishment is so great for speaking about inanimate objects, how much more so will a person be punished for speaking lashon hara about another person!
We see from here that there is even a prohibition of speaking lashon hara against sticks and stones. This explains how the Cohen must rebuke the home owner. If he says ‘I have seen a plague in my house’ (meaning definitely) he is in effect saying lashon hara against his house (since he is not deciding the Halacha or saying it for any constructive purpose), which is forbidden even on sticks and stones, and even on a house. Therefore he must say ‘like a plague’ which is not saying something definitely bad about the building (and which is for the purpose of informing the Cohen that he must come to decide the Halacha).
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar comes to add that the house owner must not make a definite decision about the matter because that is the task of the Cohen. If the house owner makes the Halachic ruling in front of the Cohen that is a sign of excessive pride, which is one of the reasons that the plague came in the first place.
Therefore the midrash didn’t tell the Cohen to list all the other reasons for the plague, because they don’t have a connection to the difference between saying ‘a plague’ or ‘like a plague’.
He will tell the Cohen saying, I have seen something like a plague in my house (14; 35)
Rashi explains that a person should not say that he has seen something which is definitely a plague in the house, but only ‘like a plague’. The source for Rashi is a Mishna in Negaim chapter 12 (Mishna 5). The commentaries there try to explain the reason for saying ‘like’ instead of definitely. Look at the Tosefot YomTov there (who brings many different explanations).
Perhaps we can explain the reason as follows. If the person would say that it is definitely a plague, he would be deciding the Halacha, that the house is certainly impure. Really this is a task that is given to the Cohen, to decide the status of the house. Sometimes there is a discolouration that look like a plague which are not, and it is the Cohen who is the expert in this. If the house owner decides the Halacha he is transgressing the prohibition of making a Halachic ruling in front of his teacher, and there is a great punishment associated with this (look in Eruvin 63a).
If so, we can better understand what the Rabbis taught in Torat Cohanim. It states there that the Cohen should give the owner of the house words of rebuke, and say, ‘my son, you should know that the plague only comes onto a house because of speaking lashon hara’. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says, ‘also because of pride’.
It is not clear why they chose only those two reasons for the plague, when the gemara in Erechin (16a) gives seven different reasons – what is special about these two?
We can explain based on the Talmud there (Erechin 16a). It was taught: Rabbi Elazar ben Parta says, ‘come and see how great is the sin of lashon hara. From where? From the spies (that Moshe sent to Israel). They only spoke badly about sticks and stones (as the Torah tells us in Shelach Lecha – “They spoke bad things about the land”). If the punishment is so great for speaking about inanimate objects, how much more so will a person be punished for speaking lashon hara about another person!
We see from here that there is even a prohibition of speaking lashon hara against sticks and stones. This explains how the Cohen must rebuke the home owner. If he says ‘I have seen a plague in my house’ (meaning definitely) he is in effect saying lashon hara against his house (since he is not deciding the Halacha or saying it for any constructive purpose), which is forbidden even on sticks and stones, and even on a house. Therefore he must say ‘like a plague’ which is not saying something definitely bad about the building (and which is for the purpose of informing the Cohen that he must come to decide the Halacha).
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar comes to add that the house owner must not make a definite decision about the matter because that is the task of the Cohen. If the house owner makes the Halachic ruling in front of the Cohen that is a sign of excessive pride, which is one of the reasons that the plague came in the first place.
Therefore the midrash didn’t tell the Cohen to list all the other reasons for the plague, because they don’t have a connection to the difference between saying ‘a plague’ or ‘like a plague’.
Thursday, April 19, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Tazria
“He shall cry out ‘impure! Impure!’” (13; 48)
The gemara in Bava Kama (92a) says: Rava asked Rabba bar Meri, ‘where is the source in the Torah for this statement that people say ‘one bad thing follows another’?’ He replied, ‘the verse states “He shall cry out ‘impure! Impure!”.
The meaning of this is that it is not enough that a person with tzora’at has this affliction on his skin, but the Torah compounded his troubles by compelling him to inform everyone that he is impure, so that they will keep away from him.
In the continuation of the Talmud there they ask many similar questions – what is the source in the Torah for a certain popular statement. The question itself ‘what is the Torah source’ implies that there should be a source in the Torah for it, and the difficulty is only in extracting it from the text. This is strange. Why should we assume that there is a source in the Torah for each of these statements perhaps they are just expressions that people say.
The answer must be based on the concept in the midrashim, that any statement which is accepted or used by everyone, must certainly be true. For example the midrash says ‘the voice of the multitude is like the voice of G-d’. Given that, we can be certain that it is contained within the Torah, since it is the source of all truth. Therefore they can ask for a source and expect an answer.
Look also at Ta’anit 9a
The gemara in Bava Kama (92a) says: Rava asked Rabba bar Meri, ‘where is the source in the Torah for this statement that people say ‘one bad thing follows another’?’ He replied, ‘the verse states “He shall cry out ‘impure! Impure!”.
The meaning of this is that it is not enough that a person with tzora’at has this affliction on his skin, but the Torah compounded his troubles by compelling him to inform everyone that he is impure, so that they will keep away from him.
In the continuation of the Talmud there they ask many similar questions – what is the source in the Torah for a certain popular statement. The question itself ‘what is the Torah source’ implies that there should be a source in the Torah for it, and the difficulty is only in extracting it from the text. This is strange. Why should we assume that there is a source in the Torah for each of these statements perhaps they are just expressions that people say.
The answer must be based on the concept in the midrashim, that any statement which is accepted or used by everyone, must certainly be true. For example the midrash says ‘the voice of the multitude is like the voice of G-d’. Given that, we can be certain that it is contained within the Torah, since it is the source of all truth. Therefore they can ask for a source and expect an answer.
Look also at Ta’anit 9a
Friday, April 13, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Shimini 2
Reasons for the Mitzvot - Keeping it all Hidden
Regarding the concept of giving reasons for mitzvot – it is difficult for me to accept the vailidity of any explanation. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 21b) explains that the Torah chose not to give reasons for the mitzvot for a purpose, because if we knew the reasons we may come to be lenient in their observance. The Talmud there gives examples of this. Who knows the secrets of G-d in all the Torah and mitzvot and their reasons, such that they can give an explanation or a reason. I have explained this objection at length elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the best explanation seems to me to be based on the intention of the Sages in the Yerushalmi (Peah chapter 4; halacha 2): It was taught in the name of Rabbi Shimon, there are five reasons why a person should only leave the peah (crops) for the poor at the edges of his field.
1. because of theft from the poor – so that the owner of the field can’t wait for a time when there are no poor people around and then tell one of his poor relatives to come and take the gifts before anyone else gets a chance. By leaving it at the end of the field, when he has finished harvesting there will be time for other poor people to gather.
2. because of wasting the time of the poor people – so that they don’t have to wait during the entire harvest until the owner decides to give them peah. Since he only gives it at the end of the harvest the poor will be able to gather at the appropriate time.
3. because of the cheats – so that the owner of the field cannot say that he has already given the peah, or chose for himself the best crops and only leave the bad quality grain for the poor. By giving whatever is left at the end of the field he is forced to give whatever is there regardless of quality.
4. because of the way it looks to others – that people passing shouldn’t say that the owner hasn’t left peah at the edge of his field. Since he has to leave it at the end they will see that he is still in the middle of his harvest and has not yet become obligated to leave it for the poor.
5. because the Torah says that you may not harvest the peaot (corners) of the field – and the corners means the edges.
This is incredible. First Rabbi Shimon gives four reasons that are understandable, then he ends with a fifth reason ‘because the Torah said so!’. Obviously all of the other reasons are based on this wording of the Torah, so this is not a separate reason, how can he just say ‘because the Torah said so’?
It must be that what he is saying is that even though there are many reasons why the mitzvah makes sense, nevertheless the primary fundamental reason is only because it says so in the Torah, and that is the sole basis for the obligation for the mitzvah.
In the Talmud Bavli (Shabbat 23a) it only gives four reasons for peah, and leaves out the final reason of ‘because the Torah said so’. This is because the opinion of the Bavli is that you can’t say ‘because’, since this is the foundation and the reason for everything, as we have explained.
Based on this explanation we can also understand the Talmud in Eruvin (21b) on the verse “Shlomo spoke 3000 analogies, and his songs were 1500” (Melachim 1. 5; 12). From here we learn that for every word of Torah there are 3000 analogies, and on each Rabbinic mitzvah there are 1500 reasons.
This requires explanation; why are the reasons for the mitzvot described as analogies, and the reasons for Rabbinic mitzvot as reasons?
Based on what we explained above we understand that it is impossible for us to give definite reasons for the mitzvot of the Torah, to say without a doubt this was the intention and reason of the Torah. It is impossible for a human to fully understand the depths of the reasoning of G-d, the Torah or the mitzvot. Therefore any reason that we give for a mitzvah is only an estimation or assesment based on our knowledge, similar to an analogy that someone gives for something, which is not the actual thing, but something which is similar to it, or leads to a better understanding of it. But this is not to say that the analogy is actually the thing itself. However, with Rabbinic mitzvot, the Sages themselves gave the reasons for their words, and we just have to explain, expand and develop them. But the basis of Rabbinic mitzvot are true and specific reasons. Therefore when describing the reasons for Torah mitzvot it uses the word ‘analogy’, because the reason is only ever an approximation, but with Rabbinic mitzvot the Talmud can use the word ‘reason’ because it could be the actual reason.
This may be the intention of the Rambam in giving reasons for the mitzvot. Perhaps he is only giving analogies and estimates and his opinions. However he should have been more careful to state that was what he was doing.
I also wanted to use this concept to answer a difficult passage of Talmud (Sanhedrin 17a) where it says that they only accepted someone as a member of the Sanhedrin (high court) if he was able to give 150 different reasons why a sheretz (an impure animal) should be pure. Tosefot there write that Rabbeinu Tam had difficulty with this. Why should we be interested in spurious logic, to purify something which the Torah has said is impure.
According to what we have said, though, there is a purpose to this logical exercise. Through this brilliance and logic we come to realise with certainty that there is no purpose in investigating the reasoning of the Torah and the reasons or intent of the mitzvot. If it were possible to come to a full understanding of the reasons for the mitzvot it must be that after giving 150 reasons why a sheretz must be pure, that we would reclassify it as such. Since we know that it remains impure because the Torah told us so, therefore we know that any reason or logic that we can give is not the same as the actual reason or logic of the Torah and the mitzvah. This teaches us that we must accept the mitzvot unquestioningly, without investigating or challenging them. Even in a place where human logic seems to dictate something other than what the Torah says.
This concept also explains the statement of the Talmud in Eruvin (13b): It is will known that there was noone to compare to Rabbi Meir in his generation. Why is the Halacha not in accordance with his opinion? Because his contemporaries were unable to fully understand his reasoning. He used ot say that something impure was pure, and would bring proofs, then show that something pure was impure and bring proofs for that as well. Rashi explains that he could show an equally reasoned argument for something that was the correct Halacha as for something that was not the correct Halacha. His contemporaries were unable to understand which opinions of his were in accordance with Halacha and which ones not.
We see from here that it is beyond human logic to give an exact reason for the Halacha, because Rabbi Meir was able to give an equally convincing reason and explanation for the opposite of the Halacha also.
I have also explained more on this topic of reasons for mitzvot in Parshat Acharei (Vayikra 17; 8) and also on Parshat Devarim (1; 16).
Now I will show you where we find that the Sages seem to say that you should look into the reasons for the mitzvot, against what we have just said, and we will give a resolution of the apparent contradiction.
If you look at the end of Pesachim (119a) “And her merchandise and harlot’s wages will one day become holy to G-d; it shall not be sotred nor accumulated, for her merchandise will belong to those who sit before G-d, to eat and be sated and for elegant clothing” (Yishiyahu 23; 18). Regarding this the Sages said: What is elegant clothing (lit. covered ancient)? This refers to someone who covers the things that were kept hidden by the Ancient One (meaning G-d). What are those things? The secrets of the Torah. One should not give them over to anyone but only to those who sit before G-d. Others say this refers to one who reveals the things that the Ancient One kept hidden, and they are the reasons for the mitzvot.
The Rashbam explains that the phrase ‘elegant clothing’ implies the secrets of the Torah that were originally hidden by the Ancient One. He revealed them and gave permisson to reveal them. Someone who reveals them will merit to all the rest of the things in the verse.
This explanation doesn’t come close to explaining all the difficulties in the verse. It is clear that this is a forced explanation. The verse says ‘covered ancient’, how can we take it from this simple reading to mean its opposite, uncovered? This is an extremely difficult explanation.
Apart from this, the Maharsha was right to question this whole piece. This statement blatently contradicts what they clearly said in Sanhedrin (21b) about the value of hiding the reasons of the Torah, as we cited above. In neither place did the Sages point out or deal with this contradiction.
Look at what the Rashash wrote in his commentary, where he asks all these questions. His answers are extremely difficult to accept.
Were I not afraid to offer my opinion I would say that the text of our Talmud is in error. Instead of saying ‘reveal the things…’ it should say ‘cover the things…’. Then there would be no contradiction between the sources, both would be explaining covered in terms of keeping hidden. They would only be arguing about the purpose in keeping these things covered. The first opinion refers to keeping the secrets of the Torah hidden, as the Rashbam explains. This refers to the secrets of kabbalah which may not be taught in public (as explained in the second chapter of Chagiga). The second opinion refers to keeping the reasons for the Torah hidden, because it is not appropriate to reveal them. In this way the Gemara in Pesachim does not contradict that in Sanhedrin. All the contradictions are resolved simply.
Regarding the concept of giving reasons for mitzvot – it is difficult for me to accept the vailidity of any explanation. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 21b) explains that the Torah chose not to give reasons for the mitzvot for a purpose, because if we knew the reasons we may come to be lenient in their observance. The Talmud there gives examples of this. Who knows the secrets of G-d in all the Torah and mitzvot and their reasons, such that they can give an explanation or a reason. I have explained this objection at length elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the best explanation seems to me to be based on the intention of the Sages in the Yerushalmi (Peah chapter 4; halacha 2): It was taught in the name of Rabbi Shimon, there are five reasons why a person should only leave the peah (crops) for the poor at the edges of his field.
1. because of theft from the poor – so that the owner of the field can’t wait for a time when there are no poor people around and then tell one of his poor relatives to come and take the gifts before anyone else gets a chance. By leaving it at the end of the field, when he has finished harvesting there will be time for other poor people to gather.
2. because of wasting the time of the poor people – so that they don’t have to wait during the entire harvest until the owner decides to give them peah. Since he only gives it at the end of the harvest the poor will be able to gather at the appropriate time.
3. because of the cheats – so that the owner of the field cannot say that he has already given the peah, or chose for himself the best crops and only leave the bad quality grain for the poor. By giving whatever is left at the end of the field he is forced to give whatever is there regardless of quality.
4. because of the way it looks to others – that people passing shouldn’t say that the owner hasn’t left peah at the edge of his field. Since he has to leave it at the end they will see that he is still in the middle of his harvest and has not yet become obligated to leave it for the poor.
5. because the Torah says that you may not harvest the peaot (corners) of the field – and the corners means the edges.
This is incredible. First Rabbi Shimon gives four reasons that are understandable, then he ends with a fifth reason ‘because the Torah said so!’. Obviously all of the other reasons are based on this wording of the Torah, so this is not a separate reason, how can he just say ‘because the Torah said so’?
It must be that what he is saying is that even though there are many reasons why the mitzvah makes sense, nevertheless the primary fundamental reason is only because it says so in the Torah, and that is the sole basis for the obligation for the mitzvah.
In the Talmud Bavli (Shabbat 23a) it only gives four reasons for peah, and leaves out the final reason of ‘because the Torah said so’. This is because the opinion of the Bavli is that you can’t say ‘because’, since this is the foundation and the reason for everything, as we have explained.
Based on this explanation we can also understand the Talmud in Eruvin (21b) on the verse “Shlomo spoke 3000 analogies, and his songs were 1500” (Melachim 1. 5; 12). From here we learn that for every word of Torah there are 3000 analogies, and on each Rabbinic mitzvah there are 1500 reasons.
This requires explanation; why are the reasons for the mitzvot described as analogies, and the reasons for Rabbinic mitzvot as reasons?
Based on what we explained above we understand that it is impossible for us to give definite reasons for the mitzvot of the Torah, to say without a doubt this was the intention and reason of the Torah. It is impossible for a human to fully understand the depths of the reasoning of G-d, the Torah or the mitzvot. Therefore any reason that we give for a mitzvah is only an estimation or assesment based on our knowledge, similar to an analogy that someone gives for something, which is not the actual thing, but something which is similar to it, or leads to a better understanding of it. But this is not to say that the analogy is actually the thing itself. However, with Rabbinic mitzvot, the Sages themselves gave the reasons for their words, and we just have to explain, expand and develop them. But the basis of Rabbinic mitzvot are true and specific reasons. Therefore when describing the reasons for Torah mitzvot it uses the word ‘analogy’, because the reason is only ever an approximation, but with Rabbinic mitzvot the Talmud can use the word ‘reason’ because it could be the actual reason.
This may be the intention of the Rambam in giving reasons for the mitzvot. Perhaps he is only giving analogies and estimates and his opinions. However he should have been more careful to state that was what he was doing.
I also wanted to use this concept to answer a difficult passage of Talmud (Sanhedrin 17a) where it says that they only accepted someone as a member of the Sanhedrin (high court) if he was able to give 150 different reasons why a sheretz (an impure animal) should be pure. Tosefot there write that Rabbeinu Tam had difficulty with this. Why should we be interested in spurious logic, to purify something which the Torah has said is impure.
According to what we have said, though, there is a purpose to this logical exercise. Through this brilliance and logic we come to realise with certainty that there is no purpose in investigating the reasoning of the Torah and the reasons or intent of the mitzvot. If it were possible to come to a full understanding of the reasons for the mitzvot it must be that after giving 150 reasons why a sheretz must be pure, that we would reclassify it as such. Since we know that it remains impure because the Torah told us so, therefore we know that any reason or logic that we can give is not the same as the actual reason or logic of the Torah and the mitzvah. This teaches us that we must accept the mitzvot unquestioningly, without investigating or challenging them. Even in a place where human logic seems to dictate something other than what the Torah says.
This concept also explains the statement of the Talmud in Eruvin (13b): It is will known that there was noone to compare to Rabbi Meir in his generation. Why is the Halacha not in accordance with his opinion? Because his contemporaries were unable to fully understand his reasoning. He used ot say that something impure was pure, and would bring proofs, then show that something pure was impure and bring proofs for that as well. Rashi explains that he could show an equally reasoned argument for something that was the correct Halacha as for something that was not the correct Halacha. His contemporaries were unable to understand which opinions of his were in accordance with Halacha and which ones not.
We see from here that it is beyond human logic to give an exact reason for the Halacha, because Rabbi Meir was able to give an equally convincing reason and explanation for the opposite of the Halacha also.
I have also explained more on this topic of reasons for mitzvot in Parshat Acharei (Vayikra 17; 8) and also on Parshat Devarim (1; 16).
Now I will show you where we find that the Sages seem to say that you should look into the reasons for the mitzvot, against what we have just said, and we will give a resolution of the apparent contradiction.
If you look at the end of Pesachim (119a) “And her merchandise and harlot’s wages will one day become holy to G-d; it shall not be sotred nor accumulated, for her merchandise will belong to those who sit before G-d, to eat and be sated and for elegant clothing” (Yishiyahu 23; 18). Regarding this the Sages said: What is elegant clothing (lit. covered ancient)? This refers to someone who covers the things that were kept hidden by the Ancient One (meaning G-d). What are those things? The secrets of the Torah. One should not give them over to anyone but only to those who sit before G-d. Others say this refers to one who reveals the things that the Ancient One kept hidden, and they are the reasons for the mitzvot.
The Rashbam explains that the phrase ‘elegant clothing’ implies the secrets of the Torah that were originally hidden by the Ancient One. He revealed them and gave permisson to reveal them. Someone who reveals them will merit to all the rest of the things in the verse.
This explanation doesn’t come close to explaining all the difficulties in the verse. It is clear that this is a forced explanation. The verse says ‘covered ancient’, how can we take it from this simple reading to mean its opposite, uncovered? This is an extremely difficult explanation.
Apart from this, the Maharsha was right to question this whole piece. This statement blatently contradicts what they clearly said in Sanhedrin (21b) about the value of hiding the reasons of the Torah, as we cited above. In neither place did the Sages point out or deal with this contradiction.
Look at what the Rashash wrote in his commentary, where he asks all these questions. His answers are extremely difficult to accept.
Were I not afraid to offer my opinion I would say that the text of our Talmud is in error. Instead of saying ‘reveal the things…’ it should say ‘cover the things…’. Then there would be no contradiction between the sources, both would be explaining covered in terms of keeping hidden. They would only be arguing about the purpose in keeping these things covered. The first opinion refers to keeping the secrets of the Torah hidden, as the Rashbam explains. This refers to the secrets of kabbalah which may not be taught in public (as explained in the second chapter of Chagiga). The second opinion refers to keeping the reasons for the Torah hidden, because it is not appropriate to reveal them. In this way the Gemara in Pesachim does not contradict that in Sanhedrin. All the contradictions are resolved simply.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
Tosefet Bracha Shmini 1
Parsha of the week - Shmini.
Tosefet Bracha (R' Baruch Halevi Epstein)
“And the stork (chasida)” 11; 19
The Talmud (Chulin 64a) explains why this bird is called a chasida (kind one), because it does kindness with its friends. Rashi explains that it shares it food with them.
From here we have to ask a question on the words of the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim. He gives the reason for the kashrut laws and the prohibition of eating impure animals because their nature is bad and their qualities are cruel. When a person ingests an animal with these traits they adopt these traits themselves.
This stork, the kind one, seems to contradict the Rambam’s theory, since it has a positive nature in sharing its food with others, and even so it is listed with the impure and non kosher birds.
Apart from that we must ask on the whole approach of the Rambam. How can we understand the idea of the attributes of an animal attaching themselves to someone who eats them? From the time of creation people have been eating the meat of animals and drinking their milk. Despite thousands of years of ingesting animals, we don’t find that human nature has adopted the traits or mentality of the animals that they eat. We don’t find any traces of animal nature in either the bodies or the souls of people.
Furthermore, it is explicit in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Avodah Zarah chapter 2, which is also brought by Tosefot on Avodah Zarah 26a s.v. akum): A child may nurse from a non Jewish woman or any kind of impure animal, and they may bring him milk from anywhere without being concerned about the prohibition of doing things that are disgusting.
If there was a concern that the nature of the animal can be passed on to one who eats from it, the Rabbis would certainly have been careful not to allow a child to nurse from a non kosher animal unless it was a matter of life and death. Look in Yoreh Deah at the end of siman 81 where he deals with this topic.
It is therefore difficult to know where the Rambam got this idea of animal nature entering people. Perhaps it came from the medical konwledge of his time, but even so it would have been impossible for him to bring this concept wihtout any basis or source from the Sages.
In answer to our first question about the stork being a contradiction to the Rambam’s theory, perhaps we can say that the fact that it shares its food doesn’t contradict its inherent cruel nature. For example we know that the raven is one of the cruelest birds, and is used as an example of the extremes of cruelty in the Talmud (Eruvin 22a) ‘he made himself cruel like a raven’. Even so the Sages have told us that the ravens love each other (Pesachim 112b). So too with mice, they invite each other to share their food with them (Yerushalmi Bava Metziah chapter 3 ;halacha 5), and even so they are called ‘wicked mice’ (ibid.). Given these examples, it is possible that the stork who shares her food does not provide a contradiction to the Rambam’s theory that her inherent nature is cruel and bad.
We still have to explain the meaning of that Yerushalmi. Why should they call mice wicked because they invite their friends to share their food? That seems like a good trait not a negative one.
But the truth is that their words are correct. The Yerushalmi is precise in its language when it says ‘when they see lots of food’ – that is when they invite others to share with them. This implies that when they only find a small amount of food, and there won’t be enough for the others, in such a case they don’t invite any other mice to share with them. From here we see that the fact that they do invite others sometimes is not because of their good traits, but rather because of their wickedness, that they wish to destroy and ruin all of the food that they find. If they were really interested in being good they would invite their friends even when there was not enough food, but they don’t, because they are concerned that if they share a small amount they may not get enough for themselves.
Regarding the original statement that the stork is called chadisa because she shares her food with others, perhaps we can also give another reason for that name.
Based on the zoology books who call this bird ‘storch’ or ‘aist’, and it is described as having a long beak and long legs. During the winter it leaves its nest and flies south to Africa or India. As spring arrives it returns to the same nest that it left several months previously (this is what Yeremiahu hints at when he says “Even the stork in the heavens knows the appointed time” (8; 7)). They are also birds that mate for life, and they never cheat on their partners. Therefore perhaps we can say that it is called chasida because of the way that it remains faithful to the same partner for its entire life, and the word chasida here means faithful and honest. We find this meaning in the verse in Mishlei (31; 26) “the Torah of chesed is on her tongue” – which means Torah of faith. Similarly in Tehillim “He will build a world of chesed”, which, based on the explanation of the Talmud (Sanhedrin 58; 2) means the honesty of family relationships (specifically that Adam could not marry his own daughter because otherwise Cain would have had nobody to marry).
Tosefet Bracha (R' Baruch Halevi Epstein)
“And the stork (chasida)” 11; 19
The Talmud (Chulin 64a) explains why this bird is called a chasida (kind one), because it does kindness with its friends. Rashi explains that it shares it food with them.
From here we have to ask a question on the words of the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim. He gives the reason for the kashrut laws and the prohibition of eating impure animals because their nature is bad and their qualities are cruel. When a person ingests an animal with these traits they adopt these traits themselves.
This stork, the kind one, seems to contradict the Rambam’s theory, since it has a positive nature in sharing its food with others, and even so it is listed with the impure and non kosher birds.
Apart from that we must ask on the whole approach of the Rambam. How can we understand the idea of the attributes of an animal attaching themselves to someone who eats them? From the time of creation people have been eating the meat of animals and drinking their milk. Despite thousands of years of ingesting animals, we don’t find that human nature has adopted the traits or mentality of the animals that they eat. We don’t find any traces of animal nature in either the bodies or the souls of people.
Furthermore, it is explicit in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Avodah Zarah chapter 2, which is also brought by Tosefot on Avodah Zarah 26a s.v. akum): A child may nurse from a non Jewish woman or any kind of impure animal, and they may bring him milk from anywhere without being concerned about the prohibition of doing things that are disgusting.
If there was a concern that the nature of the animal can be passed on to one who eats from it, the Rabbis would certainly have been careful not to allow a child to nurse from a non kosher animal unless it was a matter of life and death. Look in Yoreh Deah at the end of siman 81 where he deals with this topic.
It is therefore difficult to know where the Rambam got this idea of animal nature entering people. Perhaps it came from the medical konwledge of his time, but even so it would have been impossible for him to bring this concept wihtout any basis or source from the Sages.
In answer to our first question about the stork being a contradiction to the Rambam’s theory, perhaps we can say that the fact that it shares its food doesn’t contradict its inherent cruel nature. For example we know that the raven is one of the cruelest birds, and is used as an example of the extremes of cruelty in the Talmud (Eruvin 22a) ‘he made himself cruel like a raven’. Even so the Sages have told us that the ravens love each other (Pesachim 112b). So too with mice, they invite each other to share their food with them (Yerushalmi Bava Metziah chapter 3 ;halacha 5), and even so they are called ‘wicked mice’ (ibid.). Given these examples, it is possible that the stork who shares her food does not provide a contradiction to the Rambam’s theory that her inherent nature is cruel and bad.
We still have to explain the meaning of that Yerushalmi. Why should they call mice wicked because they invite their friends to share their food? That seems like a good trait not a negative one.
But the truth is that their words are correct. The Yerushalmi is precise in its language when it says ‘when they see lots of food’ – that is when they invite others to share with them. This implies that when they only find a small amount of food, and there won’t be enough for the others, in such a case they don’t invite any other mice to share with them. From here we see that the fact that they do invite others sometimes is not because of their good traits, but rather because of their wickedness, that they wish to destroy and ruin all of the food that they find. If they were really interested in being good they would invite their friends even when there was not enough food, but they don’t, because they are concerned that if they share a small amount they may not get enough for themselves.
Regarding the original statement that the stork is called chadisa because she shares her food with others, perhaps we can also give another reason for that name.
Based on the zoology books who call this bird ‘storch’ or ‘aist’, and it is described as having a long beak and long legs. During the winter it leaves its nest and flies south to Africa or India. As spring arrives it returns to the same nest that it left several months previously (this is what Yeremiahu hints at when he says “Even the stork in the heavens knows the appointed time” (8; 7)). They are also birds that mate for life, and they never cheat on their partners. Therefore perhaps we can say that it is called chasida because of the way that it remains faithful to the same partner for its entire life, and the word chasida here means faithful and honest. We find this meaning in the verse in Mishlei (31; 26) “the Torah of chesed is on her tongue” – which means Torah of faith. Similarly in Tehillim “He will build a world of chesed”, which, based on the explanation of the Talmud (Sanhedrin 58; 2) means the honesty of family relationships (specifically that Adam could not marry his own daughter because otherwise Cain would have had nobody to marry).
Friday, March 23, 2007
Tosefet Bracha - Vayikra 2
“When a person from you will bring a sacrifice” (1; 2)
The idea of sacrifices, their reasons and their purpose, seems on a surface level very difficult for us to grasp and understand. On the whole topic of sacrifices the Rambam gives an explanation in the third section of Moreh Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed) in chapter 3. In summary he understands that the sacrificial rites were because it was difficult for the Israelites to abandon the customs of the surrounding nations which they had been living with for hundreds of years. These nations all offered all kinds of sacrifices to their gods, therefore G-d commanded us with ‘kosher’ sacrifices that would be acceptable to Him in order to wean us from them. This idea of the Rambam’s seems similar to an idea presented in the Talmud (Temura 27a): If there is a permitted way of doing something a person won’t choose to do it in a forbidden way. They would prefer the holy and proper way of doing it.
The Ramban in Parshat Bereishit (4; 3-4) attacks the Rambam. He writes: this will shut the mouth of those who are very confused about the purpose of sacrifices. By ‘confused’ he means this Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim, sicne he was the first of the commentaries to speak about this issue in this way (apart from that hint in the Talmud). The reason that the Ramban objects to Rambam’s understanding is simple. In the times of Cain and Abel there were no other people in the world (apart from Adam and Eve), yet they offered sacrifices which were pleasing to G-d. Therefore the idea that sacrifices are a response to the idolatry of the nations doesn’t make sense.
Furthermore the Talmud in Shabbat (28b) says that Adam also brought a sacrifice when he was the only person in world.
Even though this appears to be a very strong attack, but in reality it is not a valid challenge at all. We will explain this shortly. Now we will just point out that this is not a claim against Rambam, since he wasn’t the one who invented this idea. Rather it is explicit in the Midrash Rabba on Acharei Mot on the verse “each man that will slaughter an animal” (17; 3):
Each person from the house of Israel who will slaughter an ox, sheep or goat within the camp, or outside the camp and not bring it to the Ohel Moed as a sacrifice in the Mishkan, it will be considered like murder for that person. Rabbi Pinchas said in the name of Rabbi Levi by way of analogy: this is like a prince who became very disgusting and would eat meat that was diseased or decaying. The king said, ‘if only he would eat at my royal table regularly he would become repulsed by those foods’. So too with Israel, who were desperate to chase after idols while they were in Egypt, and they used to offer sacrifices to the demons and other forbidden things. This led them to suffer all kinds of punishments. G-d said, ‘if only they would bring sacrifices to my Ohel Moed they would be separated from idolatry and be saved from punishment.
It couldn’t be more clear that the words of the Rambam are simply the ideas of this Midrash. It is unfortunate that the Rambam didn’t bring his source for this, which would have saved him from so much criticism and so many attacks.
The Midrash is similar to the words of the Mechilta (although there it is abbreviated) on the verse “Draw and take for yourselves a sheep and offer the Pesach sacrifice” (Shemot 12; 21). What does it mean ‘to draw’? Withdraw from your idolatry (i.e. from sacrificing to idols) and offer the Pesach sacrifice to G-d.
Even more than this, the basic idea of the Rambam is in the Torah itself in Parshat Acharei Mot. After it finishes discussing the obligation to bring sacrifices to the Ohel Moed it states: “You shall bring them there so that ou shall no longer offer sacrifices to the demons which you lust after”. What could be more explicit than that?
It is also clear from the Talmud (Temura) on the verse in Pinchas “Be careful to offer my sacrifice, my food” – to me and not to any other master. These few words contain the same deep and long idea of the Rambam.
Therefore it is unfortunate that the Ramban chose to use this idea as a stick with which to beat the Rambam. It is an idea which is explicit in the Torah, Talmud, Midrash and Mechilta. If he has a difficulty with this idea he should have tried to explain the text of the Chumash to answer his difficulty rather than dishonouring the Rambam.
Regarding the Ramban’s challenge from the sacrifices of Cain and Abel (and Adam) we have already said that it is ‘apparently’ a difficulty. The word ‘apparently’ was intentional because the truth is that there is no difficulty at all. The desire for idolatry was from the time of creation. We can perhaps explain the reason and basis for this desire. Originally the relationship between G-d and people was so close and apparent that it was almost like the relationship between two people. People would speak with G-d almost like with close friends and near acquaintances, like we find many times in the book of Bereishit, and like G-d spoke later with Moshe. The verse states “G-d spoke with Moshe face to face like a person speaks with his friend” (Ki Tissa). Because of this closeness they held the mistaken idea that it was possible to honour and give gifts to G-d through physical offerings. They thought that sacrifices was in some way giving glory to G-d.
After the later generations started worshipping idols they retained their earlier custom of offering sacrifices, and added many more kinds of sacrifices, details and rituals, as is normal when you have many people with false ideas. This concept reached Egypt and the Israelites became infected with this idea because of their intermingling with the Egyptians. They learnt from their hosts about sacrificing to idols and statues. Therefore now, in the desert, they were commanded to separate from them. Since it was difficult for them to separate from what had been their custom for centuries, therefore G-d gave them a way of transforming this idea into a holy one, as explained above.
G-d should forgive the Ramban for his attack on the Rambam.
The idea of sacrifices, their reasons and their purpose, seems on a surface level very difficult for us to grasp and understand. On the whole topic of sacrifices the Rambam gives an explanation in the third section of Moreh Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed) in chapter 3. In summary he understands that the sacrificial rites were because it was difficult for the Israelites to abandon the customs of the surrounding nations which they had been living with for hundreds of years. These nations all offered all kinds of sacrifices to their gods, therefore G-d commanded us with ‘kosher’ sacrifices that would be acceptable to Him in order to wean us from them. This idea of the Rambam’s seems similar to an idea presented in the Talmud (Temura 27a): If there is a permitted way of doing something a person won’t choose to do it in a forbidden way. They would prefer the holy and proper way of doing it.
The Ramban in Parshat Bereishit (4; 3-4) attacks the Rambam. He writes: this will shut the mouth of those who are very confused about the purpose of sacrifices. By ‘confused’ he means this Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim, sicne he was the first of the commentaries to speak about this issue in this way (apart from that hint in the Talmud). The reason that the Ramban objects to Rambam’s understanding is simple. In the times of Cain and Abel there were no other people in the world (apart from Adam and Eve), yet they offered sacrifices which were pleasing to G-d. Therefore the idea that sacrifices are a response to the idolatry of the nations doesn’t make sense.
Furthermore the Talmud in Shabbat (28b) says that Adam also brought a sacrifice when he was the only person in world.
Even though this appears to be a very strong attack, but in reality it is not a valid challenge at all. We will explain this shortly. Now we will just point out that this is not a claim against Rambam, since he wasn’t the one who invented this idea. Rather it is explicit in the Midrash Rabba on Acharei Mot on the verse “each man that will slaughter an animal” (17; 3):
Each person from the house of Israel who will slaughter an ox, sheep or goat within the camp, or outside the camp and not bring it to the Ohel Moed as a sacrifice in the Mishkan, it will be considered like murder for that person. Rabbi Pinchas said in the name of Rabbi Levi by way of analogy: this is like a prince who became very disgusting and would eat meat that was diseased or decaying. The king said, ‘if only he would eat at my royal table regularly he would become repulsed by those foods’. So too with Israel, who were desperate to chase after idols while they were in Egypt, and they used to offer sacrifices to the demons and other forbidden things. This led them to suffer all kinds of punishments. G-d said, ‘if only they would bring sacrifices to my Ohel Moed they would be separated from idolatry and be saved from punishment.
It couldn’t be more clear that the words of the Rambam are simply the ideas of this Midrash. It is unfortunate that the Rambam didn’t bring his source for this, which would have saved him from so much criticism and so many attacks.
The Midrash is similar to the words of the Mechilta (although there it is abbreviated) on the verse “Draw and take for yourselves a sheep and offer the Pesach sacrifice” (Shemot 12; 21). What does it mean ‘to draw’? Withdraw from your idolatry (i.e. from sacrificing to idols) and offer the Pesach sacrifice to G-d.
Even more than this, the basic idea of the Rambam is in the Torah itself in Parshat Acharei Mot. After it finishes discussing the obligation to bring sacrifices to the Ohel Moed it states: “You shall bring them there so that ou shall no longer offer sacrifices to the demons which you lust after”. What could be more explicit than that?
It is also clear from the Talmud (Temura) on the verse in Pinchas “Be careful to offer my sacrifice, my food” – to me and not to any other master. These few words contain the same deep and long idea of the Rambam.
Therefore it is unfortunate that the Ramban chose to use this idea as a stick with which to beat the Rambam. It is an idea which is explicit in the Torah, Talmud, Midrash and Mechilta. If he has a difficulty with this idea he should have tried to explain the text of the Chumash to answer his difficulty rather than dishonouring the Rambam.
Regarding the Ramban’s challenge from the sacrifices of Cain and Abel (and Adam) we have already said that it is ‘apparently’ a difficulty. The word ‘apparently’ was intentional because the truth is that there is no difficulty at all. The desire for idolatry was from the time of creation. We can perhaps explain the reason and basis for this desire. Originally the relationship between G-d and people was so close and apparent that it was almost like the relationship between two people. People would speak with G-d almost like with close friends and near acquaintances, like we find many times in the book of Bereishit, and like G-d spoke later with Moshe. The verse states “G-d spoke with Moshe face to face like a person speaks with his friend” (Ki Tissa). Because of this closeness they held the mistaken idea that it was possible to honour and give gifts to G-d through physical offerings. They thought that sacrifices was in some way giving glory to G-d.
After the later generations started worshipping idols they retained their earlier custom of offering sacrifices, and added many more kinds of sacrifices, details and rituals, as is normal when you have many people with false ideas. This concept reached Egypt and the Israelites became infected with this idea because of their intermingling with the Egyptians. They learnt from their hosts about sacrificing to idols and statues. Therefore now, in the desert, they were commanded to separate from them. Since it was difficult for them to separate from what had been their custom for centuries, therefore G-d gave them a way of transforming this idea into a holy one, as explained above.
G-d should forgive the Ramban for his attack on the Rambam.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
